740.0011 European War 1939/12252: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:15 p.m.]
1183. In the course of a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador this morning he told me that he had called on Molotov a few days ago and had sought to draw him out on the subject of Soviet-German relations. Molotov had indicated that there was no reason for alarm and said that if there were any “differences” it was his function to smooth them out. The Ambassador gained the impression that while the Soviet Government perhaps anticipates demands from Germany it assumes they will be of such a nature that they cannot be met and that it is complacent about its ability to meet the situation. He added, however, that since yesterday he had been unable to share Molotov’s sanguine outlook.
Insofar as concerns the Japanese position in the event of the outbreak of war between the Soviet Union and Germany, the Ambassador said, “I do not think we will come in right away. We will probably [Page 978] wait to see what happens and if the outcome is what I think it will be we will pick up the pieces.” He told me in the strictest confidence that the German Embassy has today started to make arrangements to evacuate 80 of its personnel and that he also had started today to evacuate as many of the members of his Embassy as possible. When he had made it clear to me that he expects a German attack on the Soviet Union, I asked him whether he could “guess the date” to which he replied, “I think about the end of the month because I have just heard that the weather in Germany is still ‘too wet’ but that by the end of the month it should be ‘dry enough’.” I then asked his opinion as to the duration of such a conflict to which he replied, “The Germans tell me that they have 35 mechanized divisions which they would employ and that they believe they can complete the operation in 2 months. I believe they have selected the months of July and August.” Tatekawa remarked that he anticipated “chaos” and perhaps even mob rule in Moscow, adding that he thought the Government would probably “run away” without making any provision for the remaining diplomats and that he hoped the situation would not be too difficult for the diplomats between the time of the departure of the Soviet Government and the entry of the German Army into Moscow. He said that he assumed the Germans would bomb the bridges on the Trans-Siberian Railway making this means of exit impassable. He expects all communication with the northwest and south would be cut off as soon as the war broke out and expressed grave doubt that telegraphic communications would be available to the Diplomatic Corps.
Speaking as a military man, he expressed the opinion that the Red Army, which he said was anxious to fight Germany, might make a creditable showing for a brief period of time but that when the break came it would be largely a question of the Germans collecting hundreds of thousands of prisoners.
Towards the close of our discussion I asked the Ambassador whether in his opinion the tension which has been now built up to a peak might not be a pressure move or bluff designed to extract the maximum concessions from Stalin. He replied, “Of course, that is entirely possible and I have no definite information that a final decision has been made in Berlin to attack. But since yesterday I have had the distinct impression that Hitler has decided to liquidate communism and that he intends to attack irrespective of any concessions that Stalin might be prepared to make and that after having liquidated communism he may endeavor to negotiate peace with England.”
Repeated to Tokyo.