Office of the Historian

761.94/1323

The British Embassy to the Department of State 85

April 22, 1941

Telegram From London Dated April 22nd, 1941

Following received from Moscow:

After receiving the message Matsuoka proceeded to talk volubly about his trip and his policies. The following were among his points of policy.

(1)
He had always been quite frank with His Majesty’s Ambassador at Tokyo about his visit. Having signed the Tripartite Pact for better or worse, he had wanted to see Hitler, Von Ribbentrop and Mussolini. He had read a great deal about the two former, but had never met them.
(2)
His stay in Moscow was merely a question of passage, though he had always wanted to achieve a rapprochement with the U. S. S. R.
(3)
He did not think that he would be able to make any agreement in Moscow. Russians were very hard bargainers.
(4)
He regretted the attitude of His Majesty’s Government and the Press and could not think why we were so suspicious of Japan’s intentions in the South.
(5)
All Japan wanted was legitimate export expansion and nothing more.
2.
I pointed out the fact that they associated themselves with our enemies in the Tripartite Pact and the well-known desire of Germany that Japan should create difficulties for us in the Far East were a perfect basis for serious suspicion.
3.
He explained that Japan had entered into the Pact in order to try and stop a disastrous war in the Far East owing to the most unfriendly attitude of the United States. But he had given instructions that attacks on Great Britain and the United States in the Japanese Press were to stop and he was most anxious to avoid a war in the Far East or embroilment in the European war.
4.
He spoke of his interview with the Pope and his own fear of the destruction of civilisation which it would take a matter of 2,000 years to rebuild. He emphasised his view of the danger of a world revolution if Germany were defeated. He had obviously been much impressed by Hitler’s anti-Red propaganda.
5.
When I pointed out that a war was inevitable if one man tried to rehabilitate the world by force, he said “at any rate he will never dominate Anglo-Saxon or the Japanese peoples.”
6.
His whole attitude displayed nervousness at the situation of his own country and fear of being drawn into the war. He obviously desired to create the impression that Japan would not fight for any southward expansion.
7.
Speaking of American attitude he said that they wanted Japan to withdraw from China, but this the Japanese would never do as they were determined to introduce the new order in China.
8.
Finally he asked me to thank the Prime Minister for sending him a copy of the message and also to express his friendly remembrances to yourself.
  1. Transmitted on April 25 to the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck); noted by the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State on April 28.↩