761.9411/101: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

786. I called on the Chinese Ambassador this afternoon to ascertain if possible the Soviet attitude towards China since the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact.

The Ambassador told me that on April 14 he had received a telegram from his Foreign Office instructing him to invite the attention of the Soviet Government to a declaration of the Chinese Government made after the signing of the pact to the effect that the action of third parties has no binding effect on China and to inquire in what respect, if any, the Soviet-Japanese pact would affect Soviet-Chinese relations. The Ambassador continued that he had immediately requested an interview with Molotov and had seen him yesterday. He said the interview was relatively brief and that in response to his statement and inquiry, Molotov had made the following observations:

1.
The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact represents the Soviet Government’s desire for peace and “has nothing to do with China.”
2.
In the course of the negotiations with Matsuoka “China was not discussed—was not even mentioned.”
3.
In response to a statement by the Ambassador that China would carry on the war with Japan “to the bitter end” and to his inquiry as to whether Molotov thought the Soviet-Japanese pact “would affect Chinese resistance”, Molotov replied that he did not believe the pact would affect Chinese resistance but that such resistance was China’s “own affair and the manner in which it could best be conducted.”

The Ambassador told me that he had not put an inquiry as to whether China could count on further assistance from the Soviet Union as he had not been instructed to make such inquiry but assumed that his Government would direct him to do so at a later date. He said that he had not made the inquiry on his own responsibility as he had not wished to give Molotov the impression that China was entirely dependent upon Soviet assistance.

In expressing his opinion to me as to the effect of the pact, the Ambassador stated that his Government was not disposed to attach too [Page 956] much importance to it and that in so far as it concerned further assistance from the Soviet Union, while he did not expect a complete cessation, he thought it would be “considerably less” than heretofore as he doubted that the Soviet Government would henceforth wish to antagonize Japan by deliveries of war materials to China on the scale of the past 2 years.

In discussing the situation in Europe, the Ambassador expressed the opinion that the Soviet Government would have to decide between armed resistance to Germany and what he described as “virtually complete surrender.”

Steinhardt