Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

761.9411/84: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, April 14, 1941—6 p.m.
[Received April 14—9:50 a.m.]

552. 1. In the absence of any information in regard to any secret commitments or understandings which may or may not have been made between the Soviet and Japanese Governments in connection with the conclusion of the pact of neutrality and friendship,⁵⁴ the following comment is of necessity based only upon the documents relating thereto published here which are represented to be merely summaries of the treaty and of the accompanying joint declaration.

2. In the comparison which obviously suggests itself between this agreement and the Soviet-German nonaggression treaty of August 1939 it will first of all be noted that the agreement with Japan is somewhat negative in character in that it does not provide as in the case of the German treaty, for concentration on problems of mutual interest, nor bind the contracting parties to refrain from aiding directly or indirectly the enemies of the other in the event of war but merely to “observe neutrality throughout the entire period of such conflict”. It is noted however that article 2 which contains this commitment uses the language “an object of military action” which is identical with that used in the corresponding article of the Soviet-German pact which phrase, I am informed, was in that instance employed upon the insistence of Germany in order to render the treaty operative in the event of aggression by Germany on a third state and it may be assumed therefore that the Japanese insisted on identical language for the same purpose. Another distinction between the two treaties may be found in the fact that the present treaty comes into force following ratification by both parties whereas the Soviet-German Pact came into force upon signature.

3. The joint declaration of both Governments concerning the mutual recognition of the People’s Republic of Mongolia and Manchukuo raises the question of the relation of the present treaty to Soviet relations with China and, in particular, aid to Chiang Kai-shek. Despite fact that in recognizing Manchukuo the Soviet Union has given its sanction to the separation from China of this area in derogation of Chinese sovereignty there is no indication either in the text of the treaty itself or in this declaration of any Soviet agreement to alter its present policy vis-à-vis the Chinese Republic. In conjunction with the all-important question of future Soviet aid to China possibly some light on the subject may be shed by the fact that the Soviet Union apparently during negotiations with Japan made a somewhat subtle distinction between a pact of nonaggression and a pact of neutrality. It will be recalled that last November in presenting the Soviet conditions involving the cession of Japanese territory for a nonaggression pact, Molotov told the Japanese Ambassador that in the event that these conditions for a nonaggression pact should prove to be unacceptable to the Japanese Government some form of a neutrality pact might be negotiated, thus indicating that in Soviet eyes there exists a greater distinction between the two types of pact than would appear on the surface. This distinction may possibly relate to the question of Soviet aid to China and in view of the importance to Matsuoka of returning to Tokyo with some agreement with Russia it is not unlikely that he was willing to accept the present agreement without the much desired commitment for the cessation of Soviet aid to China.

4. Summing up the results of the treaty from this point of observation the following conclusions on the basis of incomplete information appear to be justified.

(a) It is a great personal success for Matsuoka in that publicly at least Japan was not forced to pay any price for its conclusion;

(b) on the basis of material now available, the treaty would appear to have been entered into more for the effects which each party calculates it will have on the other concerned third parties than for the defining of the obligations and policies of the respective signatories;

(c) irrespective of the subtleties of wording or representations on the part of the Soviet Government in regard to China, the very fact of the agreement itself should tend to facilitate rather than impede a conclusion of the China conflict;

(d) to the somewhat formalistic Japanese mind the pact with Russia will be regarded as redressing the one-sided nature of the Tripartite Pact with respect to the relations with the Soviet Union;

(e) in its larger aspect and one of greatest importance to ourselves the conclusion of the pact guaranteeing Russian neutrality in the event of Japanese involvement in a war with a third country or countries will undoubtedly strengthen the hands of and stimulate those elements in Japan which favor a vigorous prosecution of the southward advance.

Repeated to Moscow.

Grew

54. For statement by the Japanese Prime Minister, see telegram No. 551, April 14, 5 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 186.