740.0011 European War 1939/9901: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 13—9:26 a.m.]
757. For the President, the Secretary, and Under Secretary. The British Ambassador told me this afternoon that he has been endeavoring for several days through the Japanese Embassy to obtain an appointment to see Matsuoka for the purpose of delivering Churchill’s message to him (see my 744, April 11, 9 p.m.47) but that, although he had spoken personally with Embassy [member?] with rank of Minister, he has not been able to obtain an appointment. When I explained that the purpose of my invitation to him to attend the theater (see my 754, April 12, 5 p.m.) was to bring about a meeting between Matsuoka and himself he said that he would take Churchill’s message with him and hand it to Matsuoka during one of the intermissions. He remarked in this connection that he had decided that should the Japanese Embassy continue its refusal to arrange an appointment for him with Matsuoka he would not attempt to deliver Churchill’s message in any other manner and commented that the present arrangement of course overcame the difficulty. He gave no evidence that he realized that his refusal to enter into relations with the Japanese Ambassador since his arrival in Moscow had been the cause of his failure to obtain an interview with Matsuoka.
The Ambassador informed me that he received a telegram from Eden this morning stating that King George of Greece had informed him that Prince Paul of Yugoslavia recently stated to the King that Hitler had told him that he must eventually attack the Soviet Union “to insure Germany’s sources of supply” but that he would choose his own time.
The Ambassador also told me that in the course of a conversation between Eden and Saracoglu, Eden advised the Turkish Foreign [Page 940] Minister that Britain was not in a position at present to furnish adequate war material to both Greece and Turkey and felt that its first obligation was to Greece. In consequence, and recognizing the inadequacy of Turkish armaments, Britain would not expect Turkey to come to the assistance of Greece but merely to maintain a defensive position for the time being. Thus the failure of Turkey to take offensive action at the time of the German attack on Greece was explained—having British consent. He added that the present British line of defense from Lake Okhrida to the Aegean south of Salonika had been agreed upon in the light of the foregoing.
Cripps further stated that he sent a note to Vyshinski48 yesterday which constituted a review of Soviet errors of policy during the past 18 months and concluded with the admonition that a joint Soviet-Turkish demand upon Germany that it vacate the Balkans might be the last opportunity for the Soviet Government (and Turkey) to avoid an attack by Germany. In this connection he said he had learned from what he described as “a reliable source” that Germany has evacuated the civilian population from Königsberg and moved eight divisions to the Moldavian frontier obviously intended as a threat to Odessa.
- Not printed, but see vol. v, p. 126, footnote 62.↩
- Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Soviet Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs.↩