762.94/516: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 9—5:55 p.m.]
709. For the President, the Secretary and Under Secretary. Matsuoka and members of his staff and the Japanese Ambassador and his staff were my guests at lunch today. The following is a summary of the remarks made to me by Matsuoka in the course of an extended and frank conversation after the luncheon:
1. Matsuoka said that neither Ribbentrop nor Hitler had asked for any commitments of any kind and he requested me to advise the President that he has not made or given any commitments whatsoever to Ribbentrop, Hitler or Mussolini. Matsuoka said he had made it clear to Ribbentrop and Hitler that as Japan had entered the Tripartite Pact to “preserve peace” Japan would not consider itself obligated to declare war on the United States were Germany to do so but that if the United States were to declare war on Germany the situation might be different. He said that should Germany declare war on the United States, which he does not anticipate, he hoped the United States would make no move in the Pacific until Japan had had an opportunity to make her position clear. Later in the conversation he said that it must be understood that Japan would adhere to her obligations under the Tripartite Pact but emphasized that Japan was not obligated to follow Germany in an attack upon the United States.
He said that both Hitler and Ribbentrop had told him that they desired to limit the sphere of the war and they had no desire to become involved in a war with the United States. They even suggested that he should take steps to discourage anti-American propaganda or agitation in Japan.
He said that he had expressed both to Ribbentrop and Hitler his desire for peace and that they had replied that they were equally anxious to bring this about and hoped to do so this year.
Matsuoka asserted that he had been impressed by Hitler whom he characterized as a genius and said that in none of his talks with him had Hitler exhibited any of the excitable characteristics generally ascribed to him but that he had been calm and reasonable.
[Page 933]He said that Ribbentrop had expressed admiration for the way in which the British were fighting, voiced the opinion that the British Empire should not be “destroyed”. He said that Hitler firmly believed he could reduce Britain by submarine and aerial warfare this spring and summer and that an invasion would not be necessary but that all preparations had been made for it and that it would be attempted should it become necessary.
He told me that the Germans were fully prepared to invade the Soviet Union but had no intention of doing so unless the Soviets substantially reduced deliveries to Germany. He expressed the opinion that the rumors of a German attack on the Soviet Union had been given out by the Germans in order to frighten the Soviets into maintaining deliveries.
He said that Italy was already under the control of the Germans, that German officers and officials were very much in evidence and that they had received express instructions not to “look down or talk down” to the Italians. Because of the mutual personal admiration between Hitler and Mussolini he was convinced that there was no possibility of the English driving a wedge between the two countries and that Italy would stand or fall with Germany. He said that Mussolini had not given any evidence of discouragement at his recent reverses and had expressed confidence that Italy would shortly “stage a comeback”.
Matsuoka said that Ribbentrop had expressed the opinion to him that the coup d’état in Yugoslavia had been engineered by the Soviets, whereas he had expressed his own opinion that the British had been responsible for this development.
2. Matsuoka said that Hitler and Ribbentrop had urged him to come to some agreement with the Soviets and that he had told them he was desirous of doing so but would not “pay an excessive price”. He said that in his three and one-half hour talk with Molotov last night he had gotten nowhere “as the Soviet demands were excessive”. He expects to see Molotov again tomorrow at which time he hopes definitely to ascertain whether there is any possibility for an agreement.
He said that he was beginning to doubt the Soviet desire to reach an agreement with Japan except upon its own terms and that he was not too sure that they could be counted upon to carry out any agreement they might undertake. He said he did not see how he could consent to major territorial concessions as he did not believe the Japanese public would accept important concessions and he had endeavored to make this clear to Molotov last night. He said that the United States could be indifferent to the Soviet Union but that Japan would “either have to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union or fight”.
3. Matsuoka indicated as he has on each previous occasion that I have talked with him his earnest desire to bring the war in China to [Page 934] an end and his belief that the President could accomplish this by intimating to Chiang Kai-shek that the United States would withhold any further assistance to China if Chiang Kai-shek refused to accept “fair and reasonable terms”. He repeatedly emphasized that if the President and Mr. Hull would “trust him” and assist him in bringing about peace in China everything in the Far East would be cleared up to their satisfaction.
4. Matsuoka stated that because of his desire to see Leningrad, his old post, he may defer his departure until the 13th and plans to go to Leningrad tomorrow night.
Repeated to Tokyo.