762.94/473½: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 12—2:23 p.m.]
400. Aside from the obviously inadequate official announcement that Matsuoka’s visit to Berlin and Rome is one of courtesy, no even reasonably authoritative information is available in Tokyo concerning the real purpose or hoped for results of his visits. Press comment has so far largely avoided any mention of an intention to stop over in Moscow either going or coming, and it is perhaps significant that the Hochi this morning had a paragraph relating to a possible stay in Moscow deleted by the censor.
Accordingly, the following views as to the significance and possible or probable aims of the visit are of necessity speculative in nature and are deduced solely from the present position of Japan both internal and external.
It is generally conceded, and indeed recently a prominent Japanese has frankly stated in private conversation with members of my staff, that one of the main purposes of the Tripartite Pact from the Japanese point of view was the expectation that it would result in the conclusion of a political agreement with the Soviet Union, which in turn would greatly facilitate the satisfactory termination of the conflict with China. These expectations have failed thus far to materialize and from the Japanese point of view the Tripartite Pact has produced no concrete benefits but has on the contrary seriously impaired Japanese relations with the United States and Great Britain.
In view of the fact that only in regard to Soviet Russia could Japan’s Axis partners conceivably exert any direct influence, it would appear logical that in so far as Matsuoka’s visit to Berlin has any specific or concrete purposes apart from general consultation and fact-finding it centers around the problem of Soviet-Japanese relations. On the basis of our information here as well as that repeated from the Embassy at Moscow there is little justification for the view that the immediate purpose of the Matsuoka visit is to conclude a prearranged agreement with Soviet Russia. It appears much more likely that Matsuoka is proceeding to Berlin to explain in person to Hitler the difficulty of Japan’s present position and Japan’s concern over the failure of the Russians to conclude an agreement with Japan on any reasonable terms, and to attempt to enlist Germany’s support in inducing the Soviet Government to modify its conditions to a point acceptable to Japan. It is of course not possible from here even to attempt to estimate what chances of success Matsuoka has of inducing Germany to undertake to bring pressure upon the Soviet Union, nor what chances [Page 918] of success such pressure might have upon the policies of the Soviet Union. The effect on Japan’s policy in general and on its association with the Axis powers in particular of a refusal on the part of Hitler to exert pressure on the Soviet Union or the failure of his efforts if exerted, especially in view of the internal difficulties outlined in Embassy’s No. 340 [390], March 11, 8 p.m.,25 is a matter of great potential importance.
Certain foreign circles in Tokyo incline to the view that the visit has been in large measure induced by Matsuoka’s well-known predilection for personal aggrandizement. The suggestions which he has thrown out that he might possibly visit England and France would indicate that he has not wholly thrust aside the tempting thought of assuming the role of mediator in the European conflict. I do not however believe that the personal factor was in itself a controlling element in his decision to undertake such an unprecedented visit but it is nevertheless true that Matsuoka is to some extent gambling his present and future position upon the success or failure of his present mission since if he returned empty-handed not only his position but that of the Konoye26 Cabinet and the policies it represents would be dangerously compromised.
In the light of the foregoing it would appear that the real result of Matsuoka’s visit to Berlin (his visit to Rome is clearly one of courtesy designed to soothe Italian amour propre) will probably not be revealed until his stop over in Moscow on his way home, and while as indicated above there is no real ground for believing that the signature of an agreement with Russia is the pre-arranged and immediate purpose of his visit, some such agreement would appear to be the hoped for result.
Sent to the Department; repeated to Moscow. Moscow please repeat to Berlin and Rome.