762.94/467½: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:45 p.m.]
484. The Japanese Ambassador told me last night that Matsuoka is now expected to arrive in Moscow on March 23 and to leave for Berlin on March 24. He said that an invitation to stay at the “Guest House” had been extended to Matsuoka by the Soviet authorities which he expected him to accept. Tatekawa is giving a dinner on March 12 for Molotov, the latter having suddenly accepted an invitation extended to him many weeks ago. The Ambassador told me that whereas no progress has been made of late in connection with the fisheries convention the commercial discussions have advanced considerably but are now being delayed by the “lack of understanding” and “pettiness” of officials in the Japanese Foreign Office charged with passing on certain minor points. He said that the subject of transit rights is still the principal subject of discussion.
Tatekawa told me in the strictest confidence that Matsuoka’s visit to Berlin is “camouflage” as his real purpose is a desire to talk to Molotov in an endeavor to persuade him to enter into a political agreement with Japan. He said that Matsuoka had “nothing he wanted [Page 916] to discuss” with Hitler or Mussolini23 and that his visit to Hitler is being made at German insistence and is primarily a courtesy to which he had agreed at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact. He expressed considerable doubt as to Matsuoka’s ability to “talk Molotov into an agreement” and seemed to derive some amusement from the fact that whereas Hitler had invited Matsuoka to Berlin for the purpose of endeavoring to “talk him into some kind of action” Matsuoka had accepted Hitler’s invitation in order to be afforded the opportunity of “talking Molotov into a political agreement”. The Ambassador expressed the opinion that Hitler would not endeavor to push Japan into war with the United States as he did not believe that Germany wished to go to war with the United States. He also said that he did not believe that his Government had any intention of “going further south than Indochina” and repeated his previous statement to me (see my 427, March 3, 7 p.m.24) that only interference by the United States with Japanese oil supplies could precipitate Japanese action.
Repeated to Tokyo.