711.94/4–741
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
Reference, John Doe paper handed to the Secretary on April 5, 1941.78
This paper is obviously a fragment. It begins with Section II.
1. Regarding Section “II. Relations of Both Governments to the European War”, the essence of the four paragraphs is a proposed Japan–United States “non-aggression” agreement. In effect, Japan is to affirm, without renouncing her obligations under the tripartite alliance, that Japan will not attack the United States unless the United States aggressively attacks Germany and/or Italy without either of those countries having committed an “act of war” against the United States; and the United States is to affirm that its relation to the European war is and will be determined “solely and exclusively by considerations of its own national welfare and security”; and the two powers are to affirm that “sharing precisely the same purposes and aims” each renounces any and all military groupings that “would lead automatically to aggressive attack upon any power which, acting independently as a sovereign nation, should find just cause for protective, military action against another state.”
Comment: The content and the phrasing of these paragraphs indicates a desire on Japan’s part simultaneously to remain a member of the tripartite alliance and to enjoy the benefit of having a pledge from the United States that the United States will refrain from war against any member of the tripartite alliance unless some member thereof commits an “act of war” against the United States: Japan is to promise not to make war on the United States, and the United States is to promise not to make war on Japan or Germany or Italy unless one of the three shall first have made war on the United States.
There might be virtue in a simple non-aggression pact with Japan and the United States as parties, were several other powers—especially China, Great Britain and the Netherlands—also parties to the same pact. Such a pact, however, limited to Japan and the United States, would be far more to Japan’s advantage than to that of the United States; in fact, the conclusion of such a pact would be of little advantage and would be of much disadvantage to the United States. Unsatisfactory from that point of view, the present proposal is perhaps even more unsatisfactory from another point of [Page 124] view. Formulated as it is to fit a situation in which Japan is a member of an alliance to the objectives of which the United States is utterly opposed, the provisions of this proposal are highly complicated and contain an extraordinary number and variety of qualifying words, phrases and clauses. For example: “aggressively attacked”; “no aggressive alliance”; “the unprovoked detriment of another”; “lead automatically to aggressive attack”; “find just cause for protective, defensive military action against another state”. Each country to such an agreement does and would interpret such words and phrases according to its own lights and in favor of itself. Japan’s record in such matters is not good.
Would it be possible for the United States to be a party to an official affirmation that Japan and the United States share “precisely the same purposes and aims”?
Would it be safe or profitable for the United States to enter into a non-aggression agreement, and especially an agreement on the basis of this complicated formula, with Japan while Japan is and expects to continue to be a member of the tripartite alliance?
2. Regarding Section “III. China Conflict”:
Comment: It may be said that the suggestions which appear in this draft on the subject of mediation of the China conflict and the manner and terms thereof are by no means without merit. It must be remembered, however, that the Japanese-Chinese conflict, no matter what it was or was not in 1937, has become a part of a world conflict; the Japanese-Chinese conflict cannot be dealt with as an isolated phenomenon and without relation to other parts of the world conflict of which it is a part; the Japanese-Chinese conflict has spread over into areas outside of and beyond Japan and China, and it has raised and involves questions and problems connected with the use of the high seas, et cetera, et cetera. It is the belief of the undersigned that so long as and while Japan remains a member of the tripartite alliance, it would not be in the interest of the United States or in the interest of Great Britain that the Japanese-Chinese hostilities be brought to an end by any process which leaves Japan’s military machine undefeated (undiscredited) and intact. Japan has sent her armies into China and is employing a part of her navy and a part of her merchant marine and a great part of her general resources in the supporting of that army there. What Japan now wants is to get a considerable part of that army out of China and to have her army, her navy, her merchant marine and her resources available for possible activities in some other direction (which might be against British interests or Dutch interests or even American interests—or Soviet interests). The world situation being what it is, the world conflict and its problems being what they are, Japan’s present involvement [Page 125] in China is to the advantage of the United States and Great Britain, and the United States (and Great Britain), if, when and as considering proposals for mediating between Japan and China toward producing a situation one consequence of which would be release of Japan from that involvement, should give intensively careful thought to the question what things Japan might be put in position to do were her release from that involvement effected. It may well be doubted whether any advantage to the United States (or to the world at large) would flow from a termination now of the Japanese-Chinese hostilities, a release now of Japan’s armed forces and her resources from the burden of those hostilities, and the existence of a non-aggression pact between Japan and the United States—while Japan remains a member of the triple alliance and before Japan has decided to abandon the existing principles and objectives of her foreign policy and to accept, in part at least, the principles which animate the policies of those countries which place law above force and peace above national self-aggrandizement.
Query: In pourparlers between Japanese and Americans on the subject of Japan’s peace feelers, might it not be practicable for Americans to indicate that before any negotiations can be entered into it will be necessary for Japan to give some concrete evidence that her thought has turned toward peace, and to suggest that one practically possible such manifestation might be that Japan cease all bombings from the air and all launching of new offensive operations by her land and sea forces in and against China?
3. In regard to Section “IV. Naval and Mercantile Relations in the Pacific”, it would appear that the proposers envisage a cooperative American-Japanese control of the Pacific Ocean and maintenance of peace therein. With regard to item “c”, query arises whether they envisage assistance to the United States, in the field of shipping tonnage, for delivery of supplies from the United States to Great Britain. On the whole subject, they look forward to details being worked out at the proposed conference at Honolulu.
4. In regard to Section “V. Commerce between Both Nations”, the proposers envisage conclusion of a new commercial treaty between the United States and Japan “if desired by both governments, which might be formulated at the proposed conference at Honolulu”; and they envisage extension by the United States to Japan of a gold credit directed toward “betterment of Far Eastern economic conditions” and toward “sustained economic cooperation of the Governments of the United States and Japan.”
Query: In pourparlers, et cetera, might it not be practicable for Americans to indicate to Japanese that for the existence of mutually satisfactory and mutually profitable trade relations, it is necessary [Page 126] that there be mutually acceptable and reciprocally dependable political practices; and might it not be suggested that, if, when and as the United States extends financial assistance for activities in the Far East, the United States will expect to extend such assistance for purposes of legitimate constructive developments by free peoples within free areas, but not for any type of exploitation of any area by the people of any other area. —It is believed desirable that we in this country, whenever we think of ultimate financial assistance to Japan, should think of similar assistance in equal or greater amounts to China.
5. In regard to Section “VI” (which carries no subtitle), this carries a unilateral expression of desire by Japan to share “equal economic opportunity with the United States in” the markets of the southwestern Pacific, and a request that the American Government assist the Japanese Government to obtain for Japan’s citizens a type of opportunity which has never been denied to them.
6. In regard to Section “VII. Political Stabilization of the Far East”, the provisions suggested carry further the concept of American-Japanese control of the Pacific Ocean, and they introduce a suggestion that the United States assist Japan in achieving “removal of Hong Kong and Singapore as doorways to further political encroachment by the British in the Far East.”
By way of comment, it may be remarked that, as set up, the provisions of this section, if adopted, would tend to stabilize the political situation in the Far East, but in a manner involving far more of benefit to Japan than to the United States; they would, if lived up to, mark the end of Japan’s program of expansion by force; they would give Japan a guarantee against aggression by European powers; and they would tend toward elimination of effective European political influence in the western Pacific.
Query: Although Hong Kong and Singapore may in the past have been “doorways to political encroachment by Great Britain in the Far East”, are not those two points now barriers against or obstacles to successful aggression by Japan in the Far East? Should the United States—and if so, why should it—assist the Japanese toward prying Great Britain out of Hong Kong and Singapore?
7. In regard to the unnumbered section entitled “Conference”, it should be noted that the proposers envisage a conference to be held at Honolulu, possibly as early as May 1941, to be opened by President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, for the purpose of drafting further agreements, on the basis of “the pre-arranged agenda”—to be “determined upon by mutual agreement between both governments”.
By way of comment, query may be raised whether this suggestion is in any way politically practicable.
- Not printed; it was supplanted by document of April 9, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 398. That document was received through Postmaster General Walker, being left with the Secretary of State by Jesse M. Donaldson, Deputy First Assistant Postmaster General.↩