711.94/4–541
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
Reference, memorandum handed to the Secretary by F[rank] W[alker] on April 4, 194176 in connection with the John Doe matter.
1. I call attention first to the concluding paragraph of this memorandum. In that paragraph the immediate objective of the Japanese proposers is indicated: “It is desired to counterbalance, as quickly as possible, the German offers to Mr. Matsuoka.” Also, there is drawn and displayed a gun: “If these negotiations with the United States fail, the Japanese authorities (which authorities?) are certain that they will lose control and a war in the southwestern Pacific will be started.”
Comment: We have no knowledge of, and it may reasonably be assumed that the proposers have no knowledge of, “the German offers to Mr. Matsuoka”. That offers—and probably threats—have been made we need not doubt. But that Matsuoka and/or the real authorities in Japan will make of Japan a German tool we scarcely need fear. With regard to a potential loss of control by the real Japanese authorities, I for one am not at all apprehensive. And that those authorities will embark upon a war in the southwestern Pacific in the event of and because of lack of success in a “negotiation” with the United States in the near future, I do not for one moment believe.—This method of approach, with an offer of a reward in one hand and a threat of a penalty in the other hand, which, incidentally, is a method not exclusively peculiar to the Japanese, needs always to be met with a calm and cold scrutiny of realities in the situation.
2. I would next call attention to the six points to which it is stated that Mr. Doe has given his “consent”:
(1) Japan is to promise that if the United States becomes involved in hostilities with Germany Japan will take no military action against the United States.
Comment: Japan in the tripartite agreement practically promised Germany just the opposite of this. Mr. Doe’s proposal is that Japan [Page 121] go back on her promise to Germany and make us a promise the contrary thereof. Query: Should we accept and rely upon the promise made to us simultaneously with the breaking of a promise made to another country?
(2) President Roosevelt is to mediate between China and Japan on the basis of principles and provisions presumably to be put before him by the Japanese and to be regarded by him as “just and prudent”.
Comment: Would it not be warranted and might it not be good strategy for us to ask that before we proceed any further with this matter Japan’s proposals for “a just and prudent peace” be disclosed to the President or to the Secretary of State?
(3) Japan is to accept financial assistance from the United States in such character and amount as “would involve Japanese business in a substantial dependent alliance with the United States.”
Comment: There may be such a thing as a controlling and a dependent relationship between the business interests of one country and those of another. Such a relationship, however, does not create and maintain a situation of political control on the one hand and political dependence on the other hand as between the two countries. Japan could easily accept and make use of substantial financial assistance from the United States and thereafter repudiate any and all promises both political and economic if, when and as she felt strong enough politically to do so.
(4) Japan is to “release” a “high percentage of Japanese merchant marine”—presumably to serve the policies and objectives of the United States.
Comment: Japan is at present embarrassed by a shortage of merchant tonnage. During the World War, when Japan was an ally of Great Britain, and after the United States had become an associate, Japan declined to make merchant tonnage available in support of her ally and associate until she was subjected to a substantial threat of what would have been an effective economic pressure. Question may be asked what tonnage Japan would be likely to be able to “release” and when and for what purposes it might be expected that release would be made of such tonnage.
(5) “Mutual pledge of Pacific peace and appropriate naval placements”.
Comment: In the light of developments of the last 45 years, including the making and the breaking of pledges and the making of wars and of peace treaties, a pledge of Pacific peace will be of little value unless and until that pledge is signed not merely by Japan and the United States but by at least a half dozen powers which have substantial interests in the Pacific, among these being the United States, Great Britain, Japan, China, the Soviet Union, perhaps the Netherlands, perhaps France. So far as “appropriate naval placements” are concerned, the United States should determine and should execute its policies henceforth independently and without the restrictions of any treaty—until such time as it becomes apparent that other countries accept the principle that law and contracts are to prevail and that use of force in pursuit of policy is not to be resorted to.
(6) A conference to be held at Honolulu and to be opened by President Roosevelt.
[Page 122]Comment: With the world situation what it is, with the problems of this country both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific—and at home—what they are, with our relationship to Great Britain and our attitude toward China and Greece and other countries that are resisting aggression what they are, it may well be doubted whether a conference at Honolulu between representatives of the United States and of Japan would be likely to serve a useful purpose and whether a conference there between and among representatives of the several powers substantially interested in the Pacific would be feasible.
3. It is stated in the memorandum under reference that a new “short statement” is being drafted by the John Doe associates and that “the draft will be completed within a few days—and will be shown to us during the course of preparation”; that the Japanese desire to have their draft shown unofficially to Mr. Hull and to have an indication through a third party whether it would be acceptable or not in substance; that if it proves acceptable Admiral Nomura would present it immediately to Mr. Hull; that an announcement could then be made jointly that the United States and Japan are negotiating for establishment of peace in the Pacific.
Comment: This, I believe, the achievement of an announcement that the United States and Japan are negotiating, is what John Doe is especially driving toward. The effects of the making of such an announcement at this time would be those of a super-colossal political bombshell: tremendous repercussions in all directions. I can think of nothing that would produce immediately more of a shock—a shock which would not be to the advantage of this country and would not be to the advantage of Great Britain.
If by any chance the highest officials of this Government decide—which I hope and trust that they will not—to enter upon a negotiation with Japan, I suggest, recommend and urge that before letting that decision be final they confer with and let their position be known to the British and the Chinese Governments.
- Supra.↩