894.24/1587
Memorandum by Miss Ruth Bacon of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs17
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Conclusions
The decisions taken in this Department upon the course of action to be followed with respect to oil shipments to Japan have been related necessarily to developments in the Far Eastern situation and to this Government’s general policy with regard to that situation. Among the factors determining the Department’s decisions upon the question of oil shipments to Japan have been the state of public opinion in this country, which on the whole has ardently desired non-involvement by this country in any hostilities and which was slow in overcoming an aversion to measures in the nature of sanctions; and the unwillingness of other oil producing countries to cooperate in an oil embargo against Japan unless this Government would give a guarantee of military assistance in case difficulties with Japan should result. With the outbreak of the European war the question of oil shipments to Japan became only one factor in the general [Page 849] strategic situation. Our military and naval authorities advised that this Government was not prepared for war on the Atlantic and the Pacific simultaneously and that action likely to precipitate trouble in the Far East should therefore be avoided. The gaining of time to prepare became a paramount consideration which affected this Government’s policy toward oil shipments, not because it was felt that an embargo upon oil shipments would lead to an attack by Japan upon the United States, but because an embargo would tend to lead Japan to use duress or military force against British or Netherland possessions in the Far East. It has been felt that such a result would have been prejudicial to the cause to which we were committed and to the progress of this country’s rearmament program, and might result in war between the United States and Japan.
Additional considerations weighing against the cutting off of all oil supplies to Japan have been the desire not to impel Japan, or to give Japan an excuse, to move against the Netherlands Indies while they were helpless after the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany, and the desire not to prejudice the ability of the Netherlands Indies to hold their own in the discussions relating to the oil shipments sought by a Japanese economic delegation in the Netherlands Indies. This Government also wished to give an opportunity for the full consideration of a proposal put forward by the Japanese Ambassador here with a view to bringing peace in the Pacific area.18
Although all oil shipments to Japan from the United States were not cut off, shipments of “aviation” gasoline were stopped in the interests of national defense and shipments of other petroleum products were permitted only under license.
During the two years of time which have thus far been gained, this Department has urged that the defenses of the United States in the Pacific be increased and that the British and Netherland Governments be encouraged to increase their Far Eastern defenses. The strategic position of the United States with regard to the Pacific has been strengthened month by month through the progress of its rearmament and naval expansion programs; through the building up of the defenses of the Philippines, Guam and Samoa; and through the reinforcement with American encouragement and assistance of the defenses of Singapore and other British possessions in the Far East and of the Netherlands East Indies. This Government, moreover, has extended material, financial, technical and moral assistance to the Chinese Government; in recent months this Government’s determination [Page 850] to assist China has been emphasized through the extension of aid under the “Lend-Lease” Act. With the conclusion of the Three Power Pact,19 moreover, opinion in this country hardened with regard to Japan so that support could be found for measures such as, ultimately, the freezing of Japanese assets in this country. Meantime although Japan has been receiving substantial shipments of certain types of oil from the United States, Japan’s economic position and Japanese morale have been drained by two more years of hostilities in China. Japan’s position has also been adversely affected by the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union, which has confronted Japan with the prospect that if hostilities should develop in the Pacific as a consequence of Japanese acts, Japan would be open to attack from all sides, and which has made Japan less likely for the time being to react to the imposition of an oil embargo by promptly moving against the Netherlands East Indies.
- Initialed by the Chief of the Division (Hamilton); seen by the Secretary of State.↩
- See document presented to the Department on April 9, 1941, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 398; see also memorandum by the Secretary of State, April 14, 1941, ibid., pp. 402, 403.↩
- Signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 165.↩