740.0011 P. W./418
Memorandum of Conversations, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
In pursuance of arrangements made between the Under Secretary and the British Ambassador, Mr. Hall called on me yesterday and again today.
Mr. Hall stated yesterday that Mr. Welles had informed Lord Halifax and Lord Halifax had reported to the British Foreign Office that in the event of Japan’s taking overt action in Indochina (of a type envisaged)91 it was the intention of the American Government immediately to impose comprehensive embargoes on trade with Japan.92
Mr. Hall said that his Government raised questions: What would we consider an “overt act”; and what was the full meaning or implication of the concept “comprehensive embargoes”. He also said that his Foreign Office gave indication of some uneasiness in regard to possible repercussions were the American Government’s indicated action to be taken precipitantly and ail-comprehensively. But, he said, they wanted to take parallel or similar or identical action themselves, and they would like to coordinate these matters as far as possible.
I said to Mr. Hall that I had not received instruction; that I was not prepared to state what would be considered an overt act or to indicate how immediate or how comprehensive this Government’s action might be. I ventured the personal opinion that the Japanese would try to proceed quietly and without spectacular show or use of force in Indochina; and that any imposition of embargoes by this country would be consummated with care and by orderly steps as has been the case all the way along in our procedure of restricting exports. I suggested that we defer serious discussion on the subject (between Mr. Hall and myself) for twenty-four hours.
When Mr. Hall came in this morning, I said that I had been given light upon and had had opportunity to give thought to the questions [Page 829] and the subject upon which he had approached me yesterday. I mentioned information sent us by the British Ambassador citing a report to the effect that the Japanese had made specific demands upon the French and had set a time limit, July 20, for reply. I expressed doubt whether that date would have any substantial significance as far as indicating that we would in the near future have overt evidence of Japan’s forceful pressure. I referred to the records of Mr. Welles’ statement to Lord Halifax and especially to the informal memorandum which Lord Halifax had left with Mr. Welles on July 14 stating that the United Kingdom authorities are “contemplating the possibility of taking” certain measures indicated in the event of a Japanese movement in southern Indochina. I asked whether Mr. Hall was in position to give us any more specific or precise indication of the British Government’s intentions. I pointed out that renunciation now by the British Government of the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty would constitute a paralleling of action taken by the American Government two years ago but would not of itself have any substantial effect beyond signifying an attitude on the part of the British Government in line with the attitude indicated by the American Government a long time ago. Mr. Hall indicated concurrence in that view. I then said that in as much as the American Government had given the British Government a categorical statement that we intend to act and that our action will be in a specified direction and of a specified type, it seemed to me desirable that before Mr. Hall and I proceed with a detailed discussion of features or items the British Government give us something paralleling our statement of intention rather than merely tell us that they are “contemplating possibilities”.
I said that the embargoes which we have under consideration are such as an embargo on export of petroleum, an embargo on export of cotton, an embargo on import of silk, and embargoes on other items miscellaneously. By the way of reciprocity, even in the matter of carrying on discussions, I would like, I said, to know what the British have in mind under the headings “Restrictions on exports to Japan” and “Restrictions on imports from Japan”. Mr. Hall said that he thought that this was all very reasonable; that he believed that there were agencies within the British Government which had formulated tentative plans, programs, schedules, et cetera, which could be brought forward in answer to my suggestions; and that he would ask for some indications of what they have expressly in mind. He said that one thing that has to be considered is the “repercussions”. I then gave Mr. Hall an outline of my personal estimate of various possible repercussions in the Far East to this, that or another possible application of economic pressure. Mr. Hall gave indications that his thought on these suggestions closely followed or paralleled mine. He said, however, [Page 830] that when he had mentioned “repercussions” he meant economic repercussions within the British Empire, and especially within certain of its parts. I said that that, of course, was something that has to be taken into consideration. But, I said, if any action is to be taken, in the event of certain action by the Japanese, it will be necessary, toward having such action have any political effect, to take the action, big or little, with a reasonable degree of promptness: if we are going to discuss matters item by item, if we are going to proceed with an expectation of getting first an agreement between this Government and British Government and second an agreement between the authorities in the United Kingdom and the authorities in the dominions, et cetera, it will be likely to happen that long before these agreements are reached (if ever) the moment for taking the action under consideration will have receded into a distant past. Mr. Hall expressed concurrence.
I said that, we having indicated to the British Government the general line along which we will act, I hoped that the British Embassy would be able to indicate to us with some specifications the general line along which the British Government will expect to act. In the interval, I said, I would do what I could toward getting my own Government to come to conclusions regarding the details of our intended action and I hoped that Mr. Hall would do the same as regarded his Government. Mr. Hall said that he would do so.
I then asked whether Mr. Hall could indicate what he thought his Government might be willing to do were the American Government to state a willingness or intention on its part to put complete embargo on export of petroleum: Would the British Government be willing or be likely to parallel that action? Mr. Hall replied that he surmised that the British Government would wish to make action on its part regarding petroleum contingent upon an understanding that if in consequence thereof the Japanese moved southward, substantial aid would be forthcoming from the United States by way of resistance. I said that this was illustrative of one of the factors of difficulty in formulating and achieving joint plans or common commitments between the British and the American Governments for parallel or concerted action: Somebody is always laying down a condition or a reservation—with the result that discussions become deadlocked or are suspended or peter out, and action which might be taken by either Government or by both is delayed and all too often never eventuates. Mr. Hall indicated hearty concurrence in that observation.
I then said that it seemed to me desirable that his Government make up its mind as to what it can do and what it considers desirable that both do and that Mr. Hall and I compare notes as rapidly as we gather information which can profitably be exchanged. I then gave Mr. Hall an outline of my personal thought, emphasizing that in all that I was [Page 831] saying I was speaking on my own responsibility and not as committing this Department or this Government, as to the advantages or disadvantages which would be likely to flow from action at this time regarding petroleum. I indicated that in my opinion action regarding silk and regarding cotton and regarding some other commodities, and action regarding freezing of funds, would come in a different category and would have a different set of effects from action regarding petroleum.
As the conversation was drawing to a close, I said that I could give no indication as to when the American Government might act or how comprehensively. But, I said, the American Government has indicated that it has its mind made up in principle and it has shown in what direction it intends to go. The sooner we can have, I said, a similar indication from the British Government, the better. It was then agreed that Mr. Hall and I would continue the discussion at the earliest practicable moment.
This afternoon Mr. Hall, at my request, came in again. I said that there was one point in the memorandum of possibilities which Lord Halifax had left with Mr. Welles that I thought we might try immediately to get some light upon: in the memorandum it was indicated that the British Government might try to cut down on exports of iron ore from Malaya by prohibiting night loading; but, I had now found that the question of a cut down on those exports had been a subject of discussion between the British Embassy and the Department and that the Embassy, in such discussions, had suggested that the British Government might be able to cut the figure from 1,900,000 tons per annum to about 1,600,000 tons per annum; and now, I wonder whether the British Government might not be prepared to say that it could and would do a good deal better than that. I said that so far as I know the only iron that Japan is now obtaining from the United States is the iron ore exports from the Philippine Islands; that we have put those exports on a quota basis, 900,000 tons per annum; that in considering the question of comprehensive embargoes we will have to consider whether we are going to cut down or cut off that export from the Philippines; that, naturally, the question of British intentions regarding their exports from Malaya would have a bearing upon our consideration of that problem and the conclusion which we might reach; and that I would like to have from the British Government whatever Mr. Hall might be able to get from them on that subject. Mr. Hall said that he considered this a reasonable request.
I then said that I would like to have Mr. Hall’s opinion, if he cared to give it, and later the British Government’s opinion as to what the British Government thinks on the subject of freezing Japanese funds, and what the British Government might be willing itself to do in regard to that problem. Mr. Hall said that he himself felt in principle [Page 832] that it might be a good thing to do; that he would not, without giving the subject more study and thought than he had had occasion to give it, wish to commit himself very definitely about it; and that he would ask his Government for its thought on the subject.
- See communication of July 15 from the Navy Department, vol. v, p. 209.↩
- See memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, July 10, p. 300.↩