740.0011 Pacific War/1882: Telegram
The American Military Mission in China to the War Department 3
163. At present I am in doubt as to American plans and objectives in regard to Burma. Your radiograms of December 24 and 184 granting broad administrative powers did not give me much information in regard to the above. Presumably, directives are on the way but prior to arrival I should like to suggest some of the limitations of action as well as capabilities within the Burma area of operations.
Burma is very necessary as an air base and our only route into China in the event we find that we must go on the defensive and withdraw wholly or in part from the line Burma–Malaya–Philippine Islands. The above is true if an offensive is planned after much preparation. Before we can crush Japan we must first destroy the Nipponese forces in Indo-China and Siam and move to the north by air, water and on land. Burma must be utilized as an air base for support of military activities in the future as well as the present. Later it may be advisable to use Chinese bases, but now the distances are too great and there are no large scale operations to necessitate their use. A detailed [Page 770] study of the uses of the Chinese air bases in the future is being made for General Marshall5 and Mr. Stimson.
The big job of the American Mission will be setting up AA6 defense, communications and facilities for the use of our air organizations in case we expect to assist the RAF in the defense of Burma. Air bases should be supplied beforehand and roads, etc., should be improved to southeastern China before we use Chinese bases for strategic bombing of, possibly preparatory to seizing, French Indo-China’s important maritime cities. The above will necessitate the organization of routes from Burma in the usual military manner. This would appear to be an economic mission (garbled).
The general plan of tactical bases, zones of supply and communication should follow the scheme below in the event the above mission is planned:
- 1.
- To the extent it can be accomplished, the British should give us independent tactical and supply bases after they have organized the Burman theatre and set up the zones of communication. The British should be consulted without delay in regard to this matter.
- 2.
- Place the Burma road under U. S. military control under the Generalissimo’s supreme authority in that area. This may be accomplished through negotiation with General Chiang. In no other way can we be sure that the road will be operated successfully. A U. S. regiment of engineers (provisional) with men specially trained for that sort of work and an AWM (Truck Maintenance?) organization to take care of all types of transportation will be essential. An American nucleus of officers and men will be needed even though Chinese labor will be available.
- 3.
- If we expect results, we must assist the Chinese in organizing the L. C. and enlarging the air bases and routes north and east of Kunming. These installations would be under Chinese command. Assuming that the above plans will meet with your approbation I should initiate requisitions for equipment and personnel.
Guerrilla organizations, whether they are Chinese or foreign, will not be effective here. I believe the people in the U. S. do not appreciate the true military value of such units. Fervently I hope that you will not assist in any way irregular organizations or individuals who propose such independent action. Only regular units, supplied in the orthodox manner and supported from the air by units with normal bases and supplies will be successful in operations in this theatre. To turn China into a Spain will bring ill to this country as past political events have shown and the best opinion believe. Little success has crowned British efforts in organizing irregular units, and the Generalissimo would be quite humiliated if we should use so-called communist units. New and unorthodox schemes will add confusion.
[Page 771]The passive spirit and the weariness of war have China in their clutches, and the Army is not keeping an appreciable force of Japanese engaged. We cannot expect China to go on the offense until the united nations put a formidable force in the western Pacific. Chinese ground troops might attack Tongking effectively if foreign aircraft gave them strong support and after they were convinced of a victorious offence on the part of the allies. To retain sectors in China from which vulnerable Japanese land and sea positions may be attacked by foreign air forces is the best hope at present.
I feel that lend-lease supplies offer less than expected in direct military returns, for typically Chinese reasons. However, measured in political terms as the returns from war supplies and credits should be, they are war outlays of an indispensable nature. To improve China’s offensive power, our present plan of furnishing lend-lease war supplies, particularly howitzers, ammunition and small arms, is necessary.
If the Generalissimo’s regime should fall, all Asiatics, including the Chinese, will be attracted to the enemy. The maintenance of Chiang’s administration by tangible indications of material aid means that the Chinese people will be kept in a potential, perhaps even dynamic, resistance.