740.0011 Pacific War/1336
The Secretary of State to Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts
My Dear Mr. Justice: In your letter dated December 19,89 you request that I write to you, as Chairman of the Commission to Investigate [Page 765] the Facts and Circumstances connected with the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, stating whether I “conveyed to the Departments of War and Navy of the United States, in the period intervening between November 1 and December 7, 1941, warnings of the immediate danger of possible attack by the forces of the Japanese Empire”. You add that for your purposes it will be sufficient if I “will state briefly approximately the times when such warnings were given and, in outline and summary only, the purport of the warnings”.
I would say in reply that I have constantly kept myself as familiar as possible with all important developments and conditions arising in the relations of the United States with other countries. Recognizing the cooperative relationships which exist between the Department of State and the Departments of War and of the Navy, especially in times of danger to this country, I had during the year many conferences with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and at intervals conferences with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and officers of their staffs. Our conferences sought a full interchange of information and views relative to critical situations all over the world, including—of course—developments in the Pacific area.
These exchanges of information and views were in addition to those which took place at Cabinet meetings and at meetings during the fall of 1941 of the War Council, and in numerous other conversations. At these conferences I was given the benefit of the knowledge which representatives of the War and the Navy Departments possessed of military factors involved in the world situation and I in turn took up political factors in the world situation and other matters of which I had special knowledge.
In reply to your express inquiry, I recall that at the regular meeting of the Cabinet on November 7, 1941, I stated among other things that relations between Japan and the United States were extremely critical and that there was imminent possibility that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force in accordance with her many times announced purpose and policy. It thereupon became the consensus of opinion that some members of the Cabinet might well emphasize this critical situation in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. Accordingly, Secretary Knox, four days later on Armistice Day, delivered an address, in which he especially emphasized this imminent and dangerous situation. He expressed the following strong warning:91 [Page 766]
“… We are not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we are likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world—on the far side of the Pacific. Just what the morrow may hold for us in that quarter of the globe, no one may say with certainty. The only thing we can be sure of is that the Pacific, no less than the Atlantic, calls for instant readiness for defense. In the Pacific area, no less than in Europe, interests which are vital to our national security are seriously threatened.”
On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles, carrying out this Cabinet suggestion in an address,92 used the following language of urgent warning:
“… today the United States finds itself in far greater peril than it did in 1917. The waves of world conquest are breaking high both in the East and in the West. They are threatening, more nearly each day that passes, to engulf our own shores.”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“In the Far East the same forces of conquest under a different guise are menacing the safety of all nations that border upon the Pacific.”
“… our people realize that at any moment war may be forced upon us, and if it is, the lives of all of us will have to be dedicated to preserving the freedom of the United States, and to safeguarding the independence of the American people, which are more dear to us than life itself.”
It will thus be seen that knowledge of the gravity of the situation in the Pacific was not confined to me, but was shared by many high officers of the Government. I might add that throughout this period officials of the Departments of War and of the Navy manifested a spirit of wholehearted cooperation and indicated in statements made to me from time to time their keen concern regarding the seriousness and critical nature of the danger.
On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of the War Council, at which the highest officers of the Army and the Navy of course were present, I emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan: I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. At the conclusion I with due deference expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various [Page 767] points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.93
Sincerely yours,
- Not printed.↩
- Omissions in quotations indicated in the original.↩
- See Department of State Bulletin, November 15, 1941, p. 391.↩
- In a memorandum dated January 17, 1942, Joseph W. Ballantine, Foreign Service Officer on special detail in the Department, wrote: “I delivered in person to Justice Roberts the copy of the attached blue [carbon copy] of a letter dated December 30, 1941. At the same time I showed him an alternative letter, the signed copy of which is attached [not printed], and explained that the Secretary had prepared this alternative letter containing additional material in case Justice Roberts felt that this would be helpful. Justice Roberts said that he preferred the shorter letter and that it contained just the material that the Commission desired.”↩