740.0011 Pacific War/1058: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 15—3:15 a.m.]
494. Official and press reaction and attitude here toward events of the past week have followed three principal lines (1, elation at our [Page 754] entrance into war with Japan based upon expectation of our early victory despite reports of initial reverses; 2, insistence upon formalized ABCD common front and joint plan of action; and 3, an inordinate and unreasoned demand that Russia at once enter the war against Japan). There is evidence of an unfortunate tendency toward complacency as to the need for further Chinese military effort but the more liberal press is now suggesting early operations against the reduced Japanese forces in China.
Magruder has shown me his recent telegrams to the War Department reporting his conversations with Chiang on military matters. I assume contents of those messages have been made known to the Department.
I believe Chiang may be unintentionally misleading in his statements on the part that China may be counted upon to play in the struggle. His plans seem to me to have a touch of unreality derived from a somewhat grandiose or “ivory tower” conception of his and China’s role. I do not believe that his military advisers entirely share his enthusiasm for all-out cooperative action. His proposal for a general headquarters in Chungking to plan and direct Far Eastern strategy is manifestly impracticable in the face of the actual situation but it would seem desirable to meet him to the extent of establishing some sort of joint military council at Chungking to exchange information and plans (carefully safeguarding vital plans, however) and tactfully to encourage and direct Chinese military operations against the Japanese in China.
The Chinese Army does not possess the aggressive spirit, training, equipment or supplies for any major military offensive or expedition, but it can, I believe, be used effectively to harass the Japanese forces throughout the country, attacking lines of communication and supply, isolating smaller units and in some measure in covering Chinese territory. Recovery of territory would have a beneficial effect upon Chinese morale and upon the economic situation.
Our problems in China it seems to me are (1) to keep the Chinese forces active against the Japanese in China, (2) to bolster and sustain Chinese morale and (3) to assist in arresting the trend toward economic chaos.
Point 1 should be the responsibility of the suggested Military Council. As to point 2, I suggested the urgent need of an information service with qualified personnel here to handle and disseminate it. As to point 3, it may become necessary for us to give financial aid in some form to support the Government credit and to encourage small-scale production of consumer goods.