711.94/254023/35

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 30

There is attached a draft of a proposed message to Congress, to which draft the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War made material contributions,30a and the officers of the Department made further contributions, which together comprise the draft of the proposed message.

In order to get this to you today it has not been possible carefully to go over this draft a second time. In fact, I myself have not had time to read it at all critically, but expect to do so over the week-end and give you the benefit of any further comment or suggestions.

I also enclose a draft by the Far Eastern officials of a possible message from you to the Emperor of Japan. My personal view continues as on yesterday to be that its sending will be of doubtful efficacy, except for the purpose of making a record. It might even cause such complications as Col. Stimson and I referred to on yesterday.

If you should send this message to the Emperor it would be advisable to defer your message to Congress until we see whether the message to the Emperor effects any improvement in the situation. I think we agree that you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of our relations, relating to actual hostility, has been reached.

I think you will desire to have any message to the Emperor dispatched in code to Ambassador Grew for communication by him to the Emperor through appropriate channels.

C[ordell] H[ull]
[Page 689]
[Annex 1]

Draft Message of President Roosevelt to Congress 31

I come before you to report to you on serious danger which is threatening this country and its interests in the Far East. Relations between the United States and the Japanese Empire have reached a stage where I consider it incumbent upon me to lay before you the essential facts of the situation and their extremely serious implications.

In the closing decades of the eighteenth century, American traders began the development of our direct contacts with eastern Asia. A little over a hundred years ago, in 1833, the United States entered into its first Far Eastern treaty, a treaty with Siam32—in which treaty there was made provision for perpetual peace and for dependable relationships. By that time American missionaries were beginning to work in Eastern Asia. Ten years later Caleb Gushing began the negotiation of our first treaty with China, and in 1844 that treaty, containing provision for most-favored-nation treatment, was concluded.33 In 1853, Commodore Perry knocked on Japan’s doors, and in the next years those doors began to open. From the earliest days to this day, the United States has consistently urged in the Far East, as it has done in all parts of the world, the fundamental importance of fair and equal treatment among nations.

Throughout the period of our official relations with the Far Eastern area there has been a general recognition by responsible officials of this country and by our people that procedures conducive to respect for the sovereign rights of countries of the Far East coincide to a remarkable degree with the traditional liberal concepts of the people of this country and the legitimate and best interests of the United States. As a concomitant of this country’s espousal of the principle of equal treatment there has been its support of the principle of respect for the territorial and administrative integrity of the countries with which it has had relations. Throughout the period when there were indications that various nations were inclined to aggress against Japan, the United States always used its influence in opposition to every manifestation of such inclination on the part of no matter what country. Simultaneously and subsequently, the United States has done the same in regard to China.

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Just before the end of the nineteenth century, the United States acquired a new position and, with that position, assumed important responsibilities in the western Pacific. Sovereignty over the Philippine Islands passed from Spain to this country. At that time there was going on what was known as the “scramble for concessions” in China and there was talk about a possible partitioning of China. It was then that the American Government took its stand on the principle of the “open door” and declared that it was its policy to “seek a solution which may bring about permanent peace to China … protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire”.

Since 1898, the American Government has been conducting in the Philippines the unprecedented experiment of acquainting an Asiatic people with the methods of personal freedom and national self-government that are practiced by our own Republic. Our constant aim has been to develop the Filipino people into a self-governing and independent commonwealth. At the same time, this farsighted experiment has been and is of far-reaching importance to us and to other peoples. It is important to the material welfare of the United States that there should exist in the western Pacific a nation friendly to us by virtue of close association and profitable relations with us. Our presence in the Philippines has helped make known to the peoples of the Orient the name, the culture, the commerce and the good repute of the United States. It has helped to establish and to stabilize our relations in general with those regions of the Pacific from which there come materials which are indispensable to our economy not only in time of peace but even more in time of war and to which we sell in increasing amounts our manufactured products and some of our raw materials.

In 1908 the major principles of American Far Eastern policy were agreed to by Japan and the United States in an exchange of notes.34 In those notes, the two governments jointly declared not only that they were determined to support “by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire”, but that it was “the wish of the two governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean” and that “the policy of both governments” was “directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo” in that region.

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In 1921 nine powers possessed of interests in the western Pacific—China, Japan and the United States among them—met in conference in Washington. The all-comprehensive objective of the conference was maintenance of peace. The methods envisaged were (1) reduction of armament and (2) regulation of competition in the Pacific and Far Eastern areas. Treaties and agreements interlocking in character and contingent upon one another were concluded. Especially important among these were the Nine Power Treaty which contained pledges to respect the sovereignty of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout China; and the treaty (among the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan) on limitation of naval armament.35

In 1929 the nations of the world entered into a treaty—the Pact of Paris, or Kellogg Pact36—wherein all agreed to resolve controversies among and between themselves by none but peaceful means.

In 1931, the Japanese army began its seizure of Manchuria. The Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations endeavored to induce Japan to revert to peaceful procedures, and the Government of the United States gave its support to that effort. While the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese armed forces was still in progress, the Government of the United States sent to the Japanese and Chinese Governments on January 7, 1932 identic notes37 declaring that the United States could not regard as legal and did not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which might be brought about by means contrary to the provisions of the Pact of Paris.

In 1934 the present administration welcomed an approach made by the Japanese Government in the form of a friendly note in which Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs stated38 that he firmly believed that no question existed between the two governments that was fundamentally incapable of amicable solution and that Japan had “no intention whatever to provoke and make trouble with any other power”. Our Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, replied39 that he highly appreciated and reciprocated these cordial sentiments, that he fully concurred in the opinion that no question existed between the two countries which was fundamentally incapable of amicable solution, and that he received with special gratification the statement that Japan had no intention whatever to provoke and make trouble with any other power.

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Almost immediately, however, there came indications of an attitude on the part of the Japanese Government inconsistent with these provisions in so far as concerned the rights and interests of other countries in China. Our Government felt compelled to make a statement in the course of which we said, through our Ambassador in Tokyo, that in this Government’s opinion treaties can lawfully be modified or be terminated only by processes prescribed or authorized or agreed upon by the parties to them and that in the opinion of the American people and the American Government no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations where are involved the rights, obligations and legitimate interests of other sovereign states.40

In December 1934, the Japanese Government gave notice of its intention to terminate the naval treaty of February 6, 1922.41

Japan, already engaged in expansion of her armed forces, thereafter intensified that expansion and in increasing measure engaged in activities obviously directed toward extension of her domination of neighboring areas and destructive of the lawful rights and interests in those areas of other countries, including the United States.

In July 1937 the armed forces of Japan embarked upon large-scale military operations against China. Soon her leaders were openly declaring that it was their determination to achieve and maintain for Japan a dominant position in the entire region of eastern Asia, the western Pacific and the southern Pacific. If they achieved this they would be masters of an area containing almost one-half of the population of the world and they would have arbitrary control of the sea lanes and the trade routes of an enormous area.

In the process of their military operations against and in China, Japan’s armed forces have taken American lives, wounded or otherwise physically abused American citizens (men, women and children), sunk American vessels—including a naval vessel—imperiled other American vessels, bombed American hospitals and churches and schools, destroyed a great deal of American property, ruined much American business, greatly interfered with American trade, and, in general, shown utter disregard for our rights—in law and under treaties: all this over and above and in addition to the incalculable damage that they have done to China and the suffering which they have caused to the Chinese people; to say nothing of the injuries which they have done to other nations and to civilization and to the cause of peace and good will among men.

[Page 693]

During the past decade the enlightened policies of the American Government, as exemplified in our record in the Far East, have been endangered by a world-wide scheme of world-wide conquest developed by the so-called Axis powers. In Europe, Germany and Italy have without provocation or excuse attacked and conquered and reduced to economic and political slavery some sixteen other countries. In the Far East, the Government of Japan associated itself with Germany and Italy in 1936, and concluded with them in 1940 a treaty of alliance avowedly aimed at the United States. Those powers have been attempting to carry out a scheme of unlimited conquest. In flat defiance of its covenants Japan has invaded and sought to overthrow the Government of China. Step by step its armed forces, passing through the China Sea in the immediate proximity of the Philippine Islands, have invaded and taken possession of Indochina. Today they are openly threatening an extension of this conquest into the territory of Thailand. That step, if taken, would place them where they would directly menace, to the North, the Burma Road, China’s lifeline, and, to the South, the port and Straits of Singapore through which gateway runs the commerce of the world, including our own, between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan has extended her threatening activities through the Caroline and Marshall Islands where, in violation of the mandate under which she received the custody of those islands, she has been secretly establishing naval and air bases and fortifications directly on the line between the United States and the Philippines.

By these steps Japan has enveloped with threatening forces the western, northern, and eastern approaches to the Philippines. Should this process go further, it will completely encircle and dangerously menace vital interests of the United States.

And while all this is going on, Japan, bound to Germany and Italy in a treaty wherein those three powers pledged one another that if any one of them is “attacked” by an outside power not already at war, the other allies will assist that one of their members by economic, political and military means; and Japan’s militant leaders declare that they will interpret their obligations under this commitment in whatever manner they may deem best suited to their own needs and purposes.

Simply stated, what we are confronted with in the Far East is a repetition of the tactics pursued by Hitler in Europe. The methods which Hitler has used with temporary success and which are being faithfully imitated by Japan, consist of a gradual expansion of power and control over neighboring peoples by a carefully planned and executed progressive infiltration, penetration and encirclement through which one nation after another is subdued and enslaved either by actual force or by threats of force.

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After this fashion and pursuing this policy of conquest by force, Japan established herself in Korea; worked her way into and finally seized Manchuria; has sought for the past four and a half years to subjugate China; has, during the period of our negotiations with her, invaded Indochina; and now, threatens with imminent attack various neighboring areas including even the Philippines.

This situation, precipitated solely by Japanese aggression, holds unmistakable threats to our interests especially our interest in peace and in peaceful trade, and to our responsibility for the security of the Philippine Archipelago. The successful defense of the United States, in a military sense, is dependent upon supplies of vital materials which we import in large quantities from this region of the world. To permit Japanese domination and control of the major sources of world supplies of tin and rubber and tungsten would jeopardize our safety in a manner and to an extent that cannot be tolerated. Along with this would go practical Japanese control of the Pacific.

Unless the present course of events in the Far East is halted and considerations of justice, humanity and fair dealing are restored, we will witness in that region of the world precisely what has already transpired throughout the continental limits of Europe where Hitler seeks dominion by ruthless force.

A program on the part of any country for subjugation and exploitation of a huge population and a vast portion of the world is of incalculable concern to every other nation.

Throughout the period in which Japan has been making it clear that such is her program, the Government of the United States had endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that Japan’s best interests lie in maintaining and cultivating friendly relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes.

For the past eight months, conversations have been carried on between the Secretary of State and the President, on behalf of the United States, and the Foreign Minister and Premier of Japan, for the purpose of arriving, if possible, at some understanding agreeable to both Governments.

Throughout this entire period, the Government of the United States has been steadfast in its support of basic principles which should govern international relations. The principles for which we have stood in these discussions may be summarized as follows:—The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international [Page 695] conditions by peaceful methods and processes. Basically these are the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations.

In our negotiations, we have kept in close contact with the Governments of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands Indies, and China. We have found those governments in complete agreement with our position. In every suggestion that we have made to Japan, the rights and vital interests of those and other nations have been faithfully represented. In the position which we have maintained we have had the moral support of these nations. We also have been given assurance of their material and military support if there comes resort to force.

We have made every effort of which we were capable toward reaching a fair and workable agreement. With the utmost of forbearance and patience, we have sought to bring Japan into commitments which would bring its practices into line with the principles which we advocate and in which the Japanese Government declares that it believes. These efforts have failed. Japan has refused to change her position or her practices, and relations between the two nations are threatened with rupture.

The supreme question presented to this country along with many other countries by the Hitler-dominated movement of world conquest is that of self-defense.

The fundamental issue between this country and Japan is not very different from the fundamental issue between this country and Nazi Germany. Concisely stated, it is an issue of autocracy versus self-determination, an issue of master and slave relationship among the peoples of the earth versus independence of nations and freedom of peoples.

The whole world is presented with the issue whether Germany, Italy and Japan are to conquer and rule the earth or are to be dissuaded or prevented, by whatever processes may be necessary, from pursuit of policies of conquest.

The question immediately presented in our Far Eastern affairs is whether the United States is or is not to stand by while Japan goes forward with a program of conquest by force—in disregard of law, in disregard of treaties, in disregard of others’ rights and interest, in disregard of any and all conventions or considerations of morality and of humanity—now in eastern Asia and the western Pacific, ultimately further afield.

In our own councils there are a variety and a composite of issues: There are issues between principles and opportunism; between confindence and fear; between reality and illusion; between clear understanding and confused misunderstanding; between wisdom and folly; between being farsighted and being shortsighted; between the concept [Page 696] of peace at any price and a concept of peace at a price commensurate with the value of peace; between accurate appraisal and inaccurate appraisal of our own strength; between full use and fractional use of our material and moral resources.

Japan’s policy of conquest and exploitation which is now being carried out in China has already utterly destroyed in the portions of China occupied by Japan the peaceful and profitable commercial relations which the United States had previously enjoyed there. It has devastated a nation which for many centuries by its devotion to the arts of peace and commerce was the most stabilizing influence on the western side of the Pacific Ocean. It threatens to transform a peaceful continent into one dominated by the military and leadership of Japan and devoted to the practice of war.

This Japanese procedure of conquest and exploitation is encircling the Philippine Islands. It threatens the commerce of those Islands and endangers their physical safety.

If it were to be successful, it would destroy the farsighted experiment which America has been conducting in those Islands and terminate the expectation of their independence. It would destroy the mutually profitable commerce which exists between those Islands and the United States, a commerce upon which the high standard of living of the Filipinos now depends. It would ruin the lifelong efforts and investments of thousands of American citizens who have transferred their homes and business activities to the Philippines on the faith that American principles of freedom and American methods of government would continue in those Islands. It would forever terminate the prestige and influence of the United States which the American experiment in the Philippine Islands has been establishing throughout the Orient.

If the Japanese should carry out their now threatened attacks upon and were to succeed in conquering the regions which they are menacing in the southwestern Pacific, our commerce with the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya would be at their mercy and probably be cut off. Our imports from those regions are of vital importance to us. We need those imports in time of peace. With the spirit of exploitation and destruction of commerce which prevails among the partners in the Axis Alliance, and with our needs what they are now in this period of emergency, an interruption of our trade with that area would be catastrophic.

We do not want war with Japan, and Japan does not want war with this country. If, however, war should come, the fault and the responsibility will be those of Japan. The primary cause will have been pursuit by Japan of a policy of aggression—in the course of which Japan’s militant militaristic leadership has disregarded law, violated treaties, [Page 697] impaired rights, destroyed property and lives of our nationals, inflicted horrible sufferings upon peoples who are our friends, interfered with our trade, ruined the legitimate business of many of our nationals, compelled us to make huge expenditures for defensive armament, made threats against us, put and kept many of our people in a constant state of anxiety, and, in general, made Japan a world nuisance and made of Japan a menace to our security and to the cause of peace, of freedom and of justice.

Our policy in relations with Japan should be and is influenced not by fear of what attacks Japan, acting unlawfully and with resort to force may make upon us but by determination on our part to give the utmost support of which we are reasonably capable to the fundamental principles of order and security and justice to which we have been and are committed, with confidence that it is within our capacity to withstand any attack which anyone may make upon us because of our pursuit of that course.

[Annex 2]

Draft Message From President Roosevelt to the Emperor of Japan 42

Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending the offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan.43 That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples, the sound character of their respective institutions and national structures, and the wisdom of their leaders and rulers—especially in Japan your illustrious grandfather the Emperor Meiji—have prospered and risen to a position of being able substantially to influence humanity.

Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.

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The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by their enlightened decisions and acts, arrested trends and directed national policies along new and better courses—thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both countries and to the peoples of other lands.

Feeling deeply concerned over the present trend of events, I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought to ways of dispelling the dark clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of restoring and maintaining the traditional state of amity wherein both our peoples may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the Pacific area.

  1. Notation attached to file copy: “This document discussed with the President by the Secretary of State. No further action taken.”
  2. See documents from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, pp. 675 and 678.
  3. Copy of another draft by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) bears the penciled notation: “About Dec. 5, 1941” (FE Files, Lot 244).
  4. Signed at Bangkok, March 20, 1833; Hunter Miller (ed.), Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, vol. 3, pp. 741, 755.
  5. Signed at Wang Hiya, July 3, 1844, ibid., vol. 4, p. 559.
  6. The Root–Takahira agreement, signed November 30, 1908, Foreign Relations, 1908, p. 510.
  7. Both signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, pp. 276 and 247, respectively.
  8. Signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, ibid., 1928, vol. i, p. 153.
  9. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 76, and Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. iii, p. 7.
  10. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 127.
  11. March 3, 1934, ibid., p. 128.
  12. See telegram No. 59, April 28, 1934, 7 p.m., to the Ambassador in Japan, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 231.
  13. See the Japanese Ambassador’s notice and note verbale of December 29. 1934, ibid., p. 274.
  14. Based upon draft of November 28 (not printed), bearing penciled notation: “Superseded” (FE Files, Lot 244).
  15. For President Fillmore’s message dated May 10, 1851, see Hunter Miller (ed.), Treaties and Other International Acts of the United Mates of America, vol. 6, p. 517.