Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

711.94/20056/14

The Postmaster General (Walker) to the Secretary of State ³³

[New York,] March 13, 1941.

Memo:

1. —Judging from recent coded-cable communications from Tokyo, we are justified in having increasing confidence that agreement with Japan can be reached.

2. —It is considered vitally important that during the next few weeks no Lend-Lease allocation against Japan be made public.

3. —Mr. Wikawa has advised Prince Konoye to instruct the Japanese Embassy at Washington to request no further official interviews pending advice from here. Mr. Wakasugi, the Japanese Minister at Washington, seems to be talking too much.

4. —Germans. It is thought that the Germans

(1) will threaten the Japanese by instigating the Russians (a) to resume direct help to Chiang Kai-shek, just as they are now helping the Chinese communist movement; (b) to create military diversions on the Siberian Border, and

(2) through the fifth column in Japan, will carry out some challenging gesture against the United States.

5. —Mr. Kurusu (recent Ambassador to Germany—now in New York enroute to Japan) states that the Germans are not only paying out great sums in graft to certain Japanese but also subsidizing some sections of the Japanese press—notably the newspaper Hochi—the fifth leading daily in Japan.

6. —Ayukawa³⁴ (the leading industrialist in Manchukuo—a cousin of Mr. Matsuoka—and the chief Pro-Axis businessman)—seems to have some suspicion of current conversations. Yesterday he cabled Mr. Kurusu (who signed the Axis Alliance in Berlin, but who is personally a convinced Anti-Nazi) asking him to obtain certain information—the precise nature of which we have not yet learned. As an agreement with America would destroy the virtual business monopoly of Ayukawa in Manchukuo, it would be better, in the public agreement, to announce the application of the Open Door to Manchukuo as well as China, but to say nothing probably concerning the use of American mechanized products for the development of Manchukuo.

7. —Baron Kano, Finance Commissioner at London, wrote a secret political report in which he stated recently that Lord Halifax told him (Baron Kano) that it was Halifax’ lively desire to achieve the restoration of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

8. —Mr. Matsuoka’s journey to Berlin is reliably interpreted as a ceremonious gesture to inform the Germans that the Japanese intend to interpret the Axis Alliance as involving no more than peaceful action. (The Japanese are most ceremonious in tendering refusals.) It is further pointed out that if the Japanese intended to strengthen the Axis Alliance militaristically, Matsuoka certainly would not have gone to Berlin.

9. —The Japanese are assisting Germany with supplies shipped through Russia and through a South American country under a three-way barter system.

10. —To stabilize the Far Eastern region, and to prevent military or political aggression by Japan itself or by Germany or Russia, it is thought that not only China must be furnished with some political integrity but that the Southeastern countries of the Far East must assume, or be given, a political status that will guarantee them against absorption by a victorious Axis. The confirmation of their character against future political aggression from Europe and elsewhere can best be made by a declaration of a Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine.

11. —If agreement is reached on other substantial points, the Japanese are quite willing to officially recognize the United States as a great Pacific Power, and to issue jointly with the United States a declaration of a Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine that would be interpreted and applied in all particulars, and by parallel action, precisely as the original Monroe Doctrine is applied by the United States in the western hemisphere. Other interested nations could be later invited to join this declaration. (From our own conversation with Matsuoka, I am certain he will not agree with this proposal; but Prince Konoye, Baron Hiranuma, etc., will agree.)

12. —It is suggested that when basic agreement is confirmed that the Honolulu Conference recommend the appointment of a Commerce Commission, a Finance Commission and a Treaty Fulfillment Commission, composed of Americans and Japanese. These Commissions to be empowered to mediate or adjust specific differences in procedure or interpretation as such may arise. The very existence of these Commissions would indicate, by diplomatic indirection, the political removal of Japan from the Axis.

13. —In view of the contemplated transfer of Japanese merchant shipping for Allied uses (conceivably through American marine brokers) it might be properly proposed that the British, while retaining political sovereignty of Hong Kong and the Federated Malay States, would permit Japanese economic participation in both sections. The British might further consider the return of Kowloon and the adjacent Leased Territory to China as a parallel action to the withdrawal of the Japanese from other sections of China.

14. —It is desired that foreign observers should not be invited to attend the Japanese-American Conference at Honolulu. In Japan, it would be explained that while other nations are vitally interested, it is also true that all nations of the world are likewise interested, but that this Conference is directed toward the adjustment of American-Japanese relations. If a more general conference is later desired, that could come by future arrangement with the various Pacific countries.

15. —Though Chiang Kai-shek has already, in secret truce terms, conceded the de facto recognition of Manchukuo, it is anticipated that he will now volubly oppose it for trading purposes. But, if he accepts it, the Japanese see no reason why the Americans cannot subsequently acknowledge the status of Manchukuo as a fait accompli.

16. —The Japanese Rulers are as anxious as we that, during these conversations, the United States should continue to exercise substantial pressure against Japan, but, by friendly gestures, deprive the Japanese “die-hards” and fifth columnists of propaganda ammunition against the United States.

17. —Meanwhile, the leading Japanese publicists and directors of Nichi-Nichi, Osaka Manichi, and Asahi, are prepared, whenever the cue is given by the Government, to create in Japan a favorable press for the United States.

P. S. (1)—Prince Konoye has hung on the wall of his private bedroom a photograph of President Roosevelt.

P. S. (2)—Mr. Wikawa realizes the unwisdom of any personal meetings with prominent Americans at this time but he has asked me to express his deepest gratitude and appreciation to the three persons thus far concerned.³⁵

P. S. (3)—This memo, as agreed, is strictly confidential to the three persons previously mentioned.

P. S. (4)—I consider that we have reached a point in our conversations at which I really need to know, unofficially yet definitely, what objectives are of critical concern to the United States. I am working on the following:

(1) Removal of Japan from the Axis Alliance;

(2) Guarantee of Pacific peace;

(3) Open Door in China;

(4) Political integrity of China;

(5) No further military or political aggression;

(6) Economic and financial treaty;

(7) Use of Japanese merchant shipping;

(8) Stoppage of all supplies to Germany;

(9) Obstruction to the spread of communism;

(10) An agreement with Japan based on certain principles as enunciated by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull.

33. Notation in red pencil by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck): “Evidently written by Walsh”; he added: “They envisage a U. S.–Japan control of the Pacific.”
34. Yoshisuke Aikawa.
35. President Roosevelt, the Secretary of State, and Postmaster General Walker.