711.94/2537
Memorandum of Conversations, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
The Chinese Ambassador called on me last evening, at his request.
The Ambassador referred to the conference which had been held yesterday afternoon at which the Secretary of State had informed rep resentatives of the B, C and D powers of the latest developments leading toward possible conclusion between the United States and Japan of a modus vivendi. The Ambassador said that he had a very real appreciation of the seriousness and difficulty of the problem which confronts the American Government and concerns all the countries represented; and he expressed appreciation of the attitude of the Secretary of State and complete confidence that the American Government would yield nothing in the field of principles and pursue no course of “appeasement”. He said the [that] he wished, however, to repeat to me what he had said in the conference regarding articles II and III of the American draft proposal. Article II, he said, presumably does not apply in reference to the conflict between Japan and China: it presumably leaves Japan free to continue her operations against China; and, article III leaves Japan free to maintain as much as 25,000 troops in Indochina and to conduct operations against China from Indochina. He went on to say that in the conversations that were held on Saturday,82 the Secretary had spoken of permitting the Japanese to maintain in China “a few thousand” troops; and that in his report to his Government he had used that expression, and he understood that the other representatives had reported in the same terms to their Governments. Now, it seemed to him, a force of 25,000 Japanese troops in northern Indochina would constitute a menace to China. Suppose, he said, the Japanese should scrupulously live up to the letter of this provision—which, if they did, he said, would be surprising—; and suppose they were to cause that number of troops to consist largely if not altogether of mechanics, engineers and aviation pilots,—such a force could seriously menace the Burma Road and terrifically harass Chinese land forces in Yunnan. If the Japanese should choose to conduct land operations against Yunnan from points outside Indochina and support the forces so engaged with large air forces based in Indochina, those operations would be just as much a menace as though the whole attack were made from points in Indochina. The Ambassador therefore hoped, he said, that we would seriously consider whether we might not make the proposal more restrictive.
[Page 651]I then took occasion to explain to the Ambassador the various considerations which have led to the formulating of the draft proposal under reference and the setting up of articles II and III in the form in which they appear. The Ambassador reaffirmed his realization of the difficulty of the problem and his confidence that we will do no unnecessary compromising. He said he knew that the situation cannot look exactly the same to each and every government, because each government views it from a different angle and in a different atmosphere. The Chinese Government is, he said, hard pressed and is apprehensive about the Indochina situation. It feels keenly its lack of the right types of equipment for effective protection of its lifeline, the Burma Road, the keeping open of which is of vital importance to it and surely of great concern to the other powers, especially the United States, which are sending in aid via that Road. He said that he realized that it would be very helpful to keep the Japanese in suspense for another three months, but he doubted whether that could be achieved. He concluded with an assurance that he would try to cause his Government to see the problem in the light in which the American Government sees it. He expressed hope that, if he did not succeed completely in that effort, we would realize that difficulties which confront China inevitably look somewhat different when viewed from Chungking than when viewed from Washington.
Later in the evening the Netherlands Minister dropped in on me. He made with regard to article III observations not dissimilar to those which the Chinese Ambassador had made, as regarding the question of the number of Japanese troops that might be left in Indochina. He also raised a question whether the matter of matériel might not be quite as important as or even more important than the question of the number of troops. He said that he had on Saturday made a long report to his Government, that he had received since then several telegrams, and that he expected to send to the Department today two or three memoranda.
- November 22.↩