711.94/2382: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 20—12:35 p.m.]
1661. As the political background against which the recent change of Cabinet took place has been fully presented in a number of my confidential telegrams of the past 6 weeks or more, I shall withhold definitive assessment of the new Cabinet and of its policies until some tangible material becomes available. As, however, American radio broadcasts and reports of American press comment indicate that the Cabinet change is almost universally interpreted by the American public as an adjustment preliminary to an attack by Japan on Russia or to some other drastic action which must inevitably lead to war between the United States and Japan, I submit certain considerations, some of which rest on fact and some on reasonable assumption, that suggest that the view which seems to have been taken by the public at home with regard to the significance of the Cabinet change may not be in accurate perspective.
- 1.
- According to an informant who is close to Prince Konoye, the latter chose to retire and in retiring insured that his successor should be one who would endeavor to follow the course laid down by the previous Cabinet toward adjusting relations with the United States and settlement of the China conflict. A valid reason for believing that General Tojo answers this description is that he is one of the five members of the Konoye Cabinet who initiated and directed the informal approach to the American Government out of which there developed the current exploratory conversations.
- 2.
- We anticipated that if either the preliminary conversations or the contemplated formal negotiations should fail, Prince Konoye would be obliged to resign to be replaced not by a civilian but by a [Page 542] military dictatorship. As the conversations have not been terminated, the conditions to which that forecast was applicable did not arise. We suggest as a likely reason for Prince Konoye’s resignation his belief that the conversations would proceed more rapidly if the American Government were to deal with a Prime Minister whose influence rests on leadership in and on support of the Japanese Army, which has the final voice in matters of policy, rather than with an intermediary. Although as anticipated Prince Konoye was followed by an army leader and not by a civilian, intimations of readiness by the new Cabinet to continue the conversations, together with the circumstances set forth in the preceding paragraph, would indicate that it would be premature to characterize the new Cabinet as a military dictatorship committed to the pursuit of courses calculated to lead to war with the United States.
- 3.
- An important aspect of General Tojo’s appointment lies in the fact that, unlike previous military Prime Ministers in Japan, he is not retiring from the Army but is maintaining his position as a full general in the Army. For the first time in recent history the Army itself is thus accepting responsibility for the conduct of government and governmental policy, a responsibility which hitherto it has refused to assume. It may also be logically expected that General Tojo’s retention of his position in the Army will afford him a greater degree of control over extremist elements within the Army than would otherwise be the case.
- 4.
- The appointment of Mr. Tani, formerly Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, as President of the Cabinet Information Board, is a favorable indication. He is known to me as a levelheaded, forward looking, and friendly Japanese. In private and confidential conversations with me he has on several occasions condemned the Tripartite Alliance in unqualified terms.
- 5.
- A member of my staff who became acquainted in Moscow with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Togo, and who has met the latter’s wife and daughter several times after their return to Japan, informs me that Mr. Togo, as Ambassador at Moscow, was highly regarded by the Soviet Government as the most acceptable Japanese representative in recent years. According to reliable reports, the Soviet Government was openly disappointed over Mr. Togo’s removal in October, 1940, in view of the conversations looking toward the conclusion of a political treaty which he had been conducting up to that time with success. On the occasion of Mr. Togo’s departure for [from?] Moscow he was tendered unusual courtesies by the Soviet Government. It will also be recalled that Mr. Togo was included in the “purge” carried out by Mr. Matsuoka last year, reportedly on the grounds that he was too moderate in his views and opposed to the extreme foreign policies carried forward by Mr. Matsuoka.
- 6.
- According to a statement just released by Domei, the official Japanese news agency, the new Cabinet will formulate no new policies for the reason that the basic national policy had already been laid down by the Konoye Cabinet.