711.94/2376
The Secretary of State to
President Roosevelt
30
Washington, October 17,
1941.
There is attached a redraft of your proposed message to the Emperor of
Japan.
In view of (a) the attitude shown by the Japanese
Minister here in a two-hour conversation last evening with Mr. Welles
and myself,31
indicating that the Japanese Government desires to continue its
exploratory conversations with us, coupled with the fact that the
Japanese Minister is, at his request, coming to call again this
afternoon for a further extended discussion, (b)
the message received by Ambassador Grew from Prince Konoye (through
Prince Konoye’s private secretary) (reported in Mr. Grew’s telegram
1646, October 17, 11 a.m.32) that the new
Japanese cabinet would be one sincerely desirous of improving relations
with the United States and of continuing the exploratory conversations,
and (c) the word we have that General Tojo, a
Konoye adherent and a “moderate”, has been designated by
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the Emperor to form a new cabinet, we
incline to the view that it would be premature to send the proposed
message to the Emperor pending further clarification of the situation in
Japan and of the probable attitude of the new government.
[Annex]
Redraft by the Department of State of “Proposed
Message From the President to the
Emperor of Japan”33
Only once and in person and on an emergency situation have I
addressed Your Imperial Majesty on matters of state. I feel I should
again address Your Majesty because of a deeper and more far-reaching
emergency which appears to be in the process of formation. As Your
Majesty knows, conversations have been in progress between
representatives of our two Governments for many months for the
purpose of preventing any extension of armed conflict in the Pacific
area. That has been our great purpose as I think it has equally been
the great purpose of Your Majesty.
I personally would have been happy even to travel thousands of miles
to meet with your Prime Minister, if in advance one or two basic
accords could have been realized so that the success of such a
conference would have been assured. I hoped that these accords would
be reached. The first related to the integrity of China and the
second related to an assurance that neither Japan nor the United
States would wage war in or adjacent to the Pacific area.
If persistent reports are true that the Japanese Government is
considering armed attacks against the Soviet Union or against
British or Dutch or independent territory in the south, the obvious
result would, of necessity, be an extension of the Atlantic and
European and Near Eastern theaters of war to the whole of the
Pacific area. Such attacks would necessarily involve American
interests.
The United States opposes any procedure of conquest. It would like to
see peace between Japan and China. It would like to see freedom of
the seas maintained and trade conducted on a fair basis. If Japan
could join with us to preserve peace in the Pacific we would be only
too happy to resume normal commercial relations, with the sole
exception of certain articles which we must keep at home for our own
defense and that of all of the Americas against possible aggression
from abroad.
If on the other hand Japan were to start new military operations, the
United States, in accordance with her policy of peace, would be very
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seriously concerned
and would have to seek, by taking any and all steps which it might
deem necessary, to prevent any extension of such condition of
war.
