Dr. E. Stanley Jones to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)

Dear Mr. Hamilton: I do not want to unnecessarily impose upon your time and perhaps your patience, by a continuation of the matter which I raised with you and Mr. Dean Acheson regarding a possible basis of settlement with Japan and China. However, several other things which seemed to me to be relevant, have come to me and I pass them on to you for what they are worth.

If the two things which I mentioned could be put together, I think they would form a basis of possible peace. The two things to which I refer are:

That Japan clear out all troops from China, including north China, and that China then make a treaty with Japan that in case she is attacked in the north by a third party, Japan would come to her help. [Page 502] This would give Japan what she says she needs, namely: A joint defense of north China against Communism; and it would give to China what she wants, namely: Territorial and political integrity. I wrote you that the Japanese Ambassador said that he personally would agree to such a solution in the north, but that he was not sure what Tokyo would do.
That New Guinea should be turned over to Japan for her surplus population. I am persuaded that unless some provision is made for Japan’s surplus population any agreement which is now made would have to be made over again within ten years. With an arable territory as big as California, she has twelve times the population of that State. This is a real problem and must be provided for; otherwise, we will have an unstable situation in the Far East.

I suggested that I thought two or three things would come out of such an arrangement: First, that you would save Japan’s face; second, that you would provide for Japan’s surplus population of [in?] New Guinea; with a population of six hundred thousand, it could probably sustain twenty millions; and third: You could relieve pressure upon China and get a generous peace for her in view of the fact that you had been generous to Japan elsewhere; and fourth: It is probable you might detach Japan from the Axis by such a stroke.

If these two things could be bound up together, namely: The treaty in regard to north China, and the giving over to Japan of New Guinea, you might have then a key to a stable peace.

The objection which you raised, and it is a real one, namely: That the Netherlands and Australia might say that we were giving away territory belonging to somebody else, and on our part we are doing nothing. My reply was that the Netherlands and Australia should be willing to sacrifice something in order for a stable peace in that section. My further suggestion is this: Why could not the United States offer a money compensation to the Netherlands and Australia in giving over New Guinea to Japan? Suppose we offered fifty millions of dollars to each. This would be a wise expenditure of money, for two days of war would consume that much, and more.

I know that the prestiges of government must be considered; but it seems to me that the greatest prestige that any government can gain is the ability to settle a matter by generous attitudes which will meet the psychological factors involved. No nation ever lost prestige by generosity. I feel that a wise radicalism at this time will be true conservatism.

I need not tell you that I did not raise the question of New Guinea in my talk with the Japanese Ambassador.

With my best wishes for you in your very responsible position,

Yours very sincerely,

E. Stanley Jones