Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

793.94/17017½

Memorandum by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine

[Washington,] September 25, 1941.

With reference to the question whether this Government should, without endeavoring to work out matters any further than we have now gone with Japan, proceed with arrangements for a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister with the understanding that such a meeting would be preceded by a public announcement that the purpose in view is to effect a frank exchange of views between the heads of states and that the negotiation of an agreement is not contemplated, there are given below certain considerations both pro and contra the holding of such a meeting:

Pro.

(1) The holding of such a meeting under any circumstances might be interpreted in certain quarters as indicating that Japan is beginning to question the ability of Germany to win the war in Europe and that Japan is seeking to explore the possibility of withdrawal in effect from the Axis. To that extent, there might accrue a temporary advantage to the forces opposing Hitlerism. Long-swing advantages would be obtained, however, only if the meeting were followed by materialization of peace in the Pacific and of a return to normal commercial relations.

(2) There would be likely to occur in Japan as an immediate psychological effect of such a meeting the development of public opinion in that country along lines favorable to the United States. The Japanese people are war-weary and would welcome prospects of peace and a return to more normal relations with the United States and to more normal internal conditions. The reaction in Japan might well give an impetus toward halting, at least temporarily, Japanese aggression, would probably strengthen for the time being any elements in Japan earnestly desiring to follow peaceful courses and might enable the Japanese Government, if it so desired, to make a substantial movement toward withdrawal in fact if not in name from the Axis and to cooperate with this and similarly minded nations.

(3) Such a meeting might serve as useful evidence to the Japanese people that this Government entertains no hostility against Japan and is willing to listen to a presentation of Japan’s case.

(4) Such a meeting would afford an opportunity for the President to talk with the utmost candor directly to the Prime Minister of Japan and to make clear in a way that would be impossible through diplomatic channels the determination of this Government to adhere to its principles and its policies and the intention of this Government to oppose further aggression by Japan.

Contra.

(1) Regardless of whether we announce in advance that the negotiation of an agreement is not contemplated, there is bound to be widespread belief that some agreement is in prospect. Even if subsequent to the meeting we announce that no agreement has been concluded, it is likely that there would be widespread belief that some kind of secret agreement or understanding has been reached. This belief probably would be dispelled only through the continuance for some time thereafter of our present measures against Japan.

The presumptions that would thus be created and continue to prevail would have a far-reaching and immediate effect in China detrimental to the interests of the forces opposing aggression. Even though we have categorically assured the Chinese Government that we will not in any way sacrifice the principles for which we stand and even though the Chinese Government has publicly announced its confidence in this Government, there would probably occur a lowering of morale and an impairment of the will and determination to continue resistance to Japanese aggression. Such a development might readily set in motion in China a process of political disintegration and disaffection which [would?] play into the hands of Japanese imperialists. If present morale in China were seriously impaired, it would probably be most difficult to revive in China the psychology necessary to continue effective resistance against Japan.

The misgivings of the British and the Dutch and other Governments would probably not be as serious as in the case of China but there might result, nevertheless, a breakdown in their efforts to maintain a firm front against Japan.

(2) Announcement of the meeting would arouse Japanese people’s hopes that the meeting would be followed by a settlement of the “China affair”, the cessation of this country’s aid to China, and the restoration of normal commercial relations with the United States. When those hopes failed to materialize within a short period, would not the resulting reaction in Japan be more detrimental to our interests than if the meeting had not been held? Moreover, such a meeting would create illusions for the Japanese people and would operate as a factor to hide from the Japanese people the wide discrepancy between the viewpoints of the American and the Japanese Governments.

(3) The effect of such a meeting upon the American public would in all probability be unfavorable, particularly among those groups which have exhibited an uncompromising stand on the question of stopping Japanese aggression. Other sections of the American public might obtain the erroneous impression that the positions of the United States and Japan are not wide apart and there might thus occur a weakening of public support for future measures which it might be desirable to take against Japan.

It is believed that the arguments contra the holding of the proposed meeting of chiefs of Governments under the conditions outlined outweigh the arguments pro.