793.94/16871
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Third Secretary of Embassy in China (Service)14
| Present: | The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Quo Tai-chi. |
| The American Ambassador, Mr. Gauss. | |
| Mr. Service. |
The Ambassador called on the Minister of Foreign Affairs this afternoon at the latter’s request.
The Foreign Minister opened the conversation by referring to the recent statements regarding negotiations at Washington between the governments of the United States and Japan. He said that these reports, and the failure of the President to refer specifically to Japan [Page 437] in his recent speeches and statements, had given rise to considerable uneasiness on the part of the general Chinese public; and that while he and the Generalissimo had confidence in President Roosevelt and the United States, they felt that it would be very desirable if the President in his forthcoming speech on September 11 would make some reassuring and helpful reference to China. He asked that the Ambassador transmit this request to Washington.
The Foreign Minister went on to say that the Generalissimo was granting an exclusive interview to the United Press correspondent in Chungking. He mentioned that this was not the usual practice of the Generalissimo who had not received the foreign press for some time; but that he had urged the Generalissimo to grant the request of the United Press and to use the opportunity to issue a statement. The Minister said that the statement would be to the general effect that China has borne the brunt of the fight against Japan and Japanese aggression for over 4 years and has sacrificed much blood and treasure, that it does not regret these losses and will continue the struggle to a successful conclusion regardless of what may happen, but that it believes any negotiated peace or arrangement with Japan not to be to the advantage of China, nor, in the long view, to the advantage of the United States because Japan is the enemy of all other powers in the Far East.
At this point the Foreign Minister made some remarks on Chinese morale. He acknowledged general appreciation of American material aid to China and said that the announcement of the sending of an American military mission to China offset the failure to refer to China in the statement following the Roosevelt–Churchill meeting. But in a general way he gave the impression that the Chinese people felt that they had suffered a great deal during the past 4 years and that they were apt to be easily discouraged by suggestions that they are not receiving wholehearted support from the United States.
The Minister then said that the Chinese Government had received “rather definite information” that the negotiations in Washington had reached a fairly concrete stage; that after the Roosevelt–Churchill meeting the United States, with British support, had presented to the Japanese a proposal along the following general lines: Japan, together with France, Thailand, China and the other concerned countries, to agree to the neutralization of Thailand and Indochina, and Japan in return to be granted access to raw materials sufficient for her “legitimate needs”. The Konoye letter, he said, had indicated Japan’s general acceptance of these principles, with the modification that Japan be entitled to keep not more than 10,000 troops in Indo-China. The Foreign Minister appeared to think that this had been agreed to by the United States after Japan had given a general undertaking [Page 438] not to increase or strengthen the bases or fortifications in Indo-China, and not to embark on any “new military adventures”.
The Ambassador indicated an interest in the source of the Minister’s precise information on the subject. The Foreign Minister stated that Ambassador Hu Shih had reported only the neutrality suggestion; the rest of the information concerning the Konoye letter had come from “other sources”. Mr. Gauss, explaining that he was uninformed of any proposals or arrangements such as those outlined by the Foreign Minister, read to the Minister a paraphrase of the Department’s telegram no. 209 of September 2, 10 a.m. [p.m.] in regard to the informal exploratory conversations which had been proceeding for some time but had reached no conclusion. The Foreign Minister asked the Ambassador to reread the sentence regarding the consideration only of proposals conforming with basic American principles. He commented that the statement was “very general”.
Having indicated his confidence in the reliability of his information, the Foreign Minister turned to a discussion of the effect such an agreement would have upon China. It would first, he said, relieve pressure on Japan. He admitted some uncertainty as to when the promised access to raw materials for Japan was to come into effect—whether immediately or not until after conclusion of peace—but indicated his strong belief that it would result in prompt relaxing of the economic restraints (freezing of funds and export control) which Japan was now beginning to feel very severely. At the same time, by relaxing the pressure on Japan (the Foreign Minister here appeared to refer also to political pressure) it would give Japan a breathing spell to watch international developments. The second general effect would be, by reducing the scope of Japan’s activity, to make it possible—and likely—for it to devote a larger share of its strength and resources to the exploitation and further conquest of China. The Foreign Minister expatiated at some length on this latter point, and said that China could not view the proposal as isolated from the general situation in the Far East and that it could not be expected to welcome an arrangement which would inevitably, directly or indirectly, work to China’s disadvantage.
The Foreign Minister then made some remarks along lines suggesting that the proposed agreement was also not to the interest of the United States. He mentioned the unreliability of the Konoye government or of any government in Japan, and said that any agreement entered into by one government could be easily disavowed by a succeeding cabinet. He went on to say that, according to his information, the line followed by Ambassador Nomura in Washington has been to promote the impression that there is still a liberal element in Japan, which if given a chance might be able to overcome the more [Page 439] extreme influences in the country; but that, if Japan continues to be subjected to pressure, the Konoye government will be overthrown and this so-called liberal element will be submerged by a government of military men. The Minister referred to the tactics used by Japan in 1931 when the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington and London were successful in pleading that it was better to give the liberal government a chance than to force its overthrow, and compared that situation with the present. He remarked that the “liberal” elements in Japan had never succeeded in winning out over the extremists. Developing this idea, he said that, just as the Japanese militarists have set up puppet governments on the Asiatic continent, so also they had organized puppet governments in Japan, and that Konoye’s cabinet was nothing more than a puppet of the military, intended to serve as a stop-gap and to be gotten rid of when no longer useful. Adverting to the desire of the Japanese to gain time; he appreciated that the United States and Great Britain might also wish to delay a crisis. But he felt that Japan had more to gain by delay than the United States.
The Ambassador referred to reports of differences of opinion between Japanese military and naval groups, the latter perhaps being now disposed to seek some settlement in the Far East. The Foreign Minister did not entirely agree. He said that there were factions and divisions of opinion in the Japanese Navy just as in the Army; that undoubtedly a more conservative section of the Navy hesitates to risk an encounter with an opponent as strong as the United States; but that the extremist element in Japan was still strong and the situation might be forced by other factions such as the Army. As an indication of the strength of these extremist elements and their dissatisfaction with the policy of the present government, he mentioned the recent assault on Baron Hiranuma who he believed was selected as the victim because he, rather than Prince Konoye, was actually the strongest member of the cabinet.
The Foreign Minister then turned to a discussion of what he termed the community of interests between China and the United States and the mutual advantage of the two countries “sticking together”. He twice made a statement to the effect that for material as well as for moral reasons, for strategic as well as for political considerations, the United States should support China.
The Ambassador asked the Foreign Minister for his opinion of the likelihood of a Japanese attack on Russia. The Minister again referred (in vaguer terms, however, than before) to the reported provision that Japan would not embark on fresh military undertakings. But he indicated his opinion of the worth of this by saying that he thought the chances of an attack still good. He went on to say that [Page 440] the equivalent of five divisions of Japanese troops had now been withdrawn from China, that extensive military activity continued in Manchuria, and that winter would not deter the Japanese from operations in Siberia in as much as their mechanized equipment could continue to operate and might find the freezing of the rivers an actual advantage.
The Ambassador asked whether there had been any recent Japanese peace overtures toward China. The Minister replied: “Yes, in Washington”. He said that he felt that he enjoyed the complete confidence of the Generalissimo in this respect and that he was sure the Generalissimo would not receive any proposals for a negotiated peace with Japan. He said he understood, however, that “sometime ago” the Japanese had asked President Roosevelt to put Tokyo and Chungking in touch with each other, but that the President had declined, giving as his reason that if the Japanese wished to make peace with China there was nothing to prevent them from approaching China directly.
The Foreign Minister then made some remarks concerning general principles of the democracies and said that the eight points agreed upon and announced by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill constituted the best statement of their policies and objectives that had so far been made. He added that this was “more than the United States had when it entered the last war”.
The Ambassador brought the conversation back to its starting point by asking for a summing up of the views which the Minister wished him to communicate to Washington by telegraph. The Minister asked that there be included the hope that the President would make some favorable reference to China and that as long as Japan was continuing its aggression in China, the United States would not relax in any way the economic measures now enforced against Japan. He again referred to the subject of Chinese public opinion and said that much of what he had been saying was merely a repetition of writings of Chinese political commentators in the press. There followed brief mention of several recent articles in such papers as the Central China Daily News.
As he was taking his leave, the Ambassador said that he assumed that the Chinese Ambassador in Washington had been informed of the views of the Chinese Government regarding the proposed “arrangement” under discussion between Japan and the United States and that Dr. Hu Shih had communicated these views to the Department of State. The Foreign Minister remarked that Ambassador Hu Shih, whose attitude is that “one should not doubt a friend” may have been diffident about making China’s position known. He said that he had this morning telegraphed to Dr. Hu telling him that he had invited the American Ambassador to come to see him today, and telling Dr. Hu Shih to make the Chinese views known in Washington; however, [Page 441] he did not expect that Ambassador Hu would be likely to be able to see the Secretary of State immediately.
Mr. Gauss took his leave, saying that he would communicate the Foreign Minister’s views to Washington.
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in China in his covering despatch No. 134, September 11; received September 25.↩