711.94/23446/25

Memorandum by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine94

The new Japanese proposal,95 although there is some ambiguity as to what is intended, appears in many material respects to differ both in spirit and in the letter from the principles which we consistently stood for in the informal conversations with the Japanese Ambassador and which Konoye has stated that he stood for. The principal differences are as follows:

(1)
Japan offers to make no commitment in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan will offer to China. There is no assurance of an intention by Japan to respect China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from interference in China’s internal affairs, to treat China as an equal, and to conform to the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations.
(2)
The proposal that “so long as the economic activities of the United States in China are carried out on an equitable basis, such activities will not be restricted” clearly implies that it is a matter for [Page 429] decision by Japan as to how American trade and commerce in China is henceforth to be conducted.
(3)
The entire spirit of the Japanese proposal seems to imply that the destiny of the Western Pacific area is a matter to be settled between Japan and the United States without reference to the rights, interests and wishes of the other countries affected.

Whereas the original proposals contemplated that the United States, after being satisfied that Japan intended to seek terms for a peace settlement with China which would be reasonably fair and just to all concerned, would exercise its good offices to bring the Chinese and Japanese Governments together into direct negotiations, the present proposal does not appear to contemplate such good offices by the United States, but that Japan will undertake directly to bring about a rehabilitation of Sino-Japanese relations and that the United States would refrain from taking measures “which would prejudice Japan’s efforts to settle the China affair”. This clearly indicates that Japan expects that if the United States should discontinue aid to the Chungking Government, Japan would be in position to force the Chungking Government to seek a peace with Japan and that Japan will be able largely to dictate that settlement.