711.94/2283
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
The Chinese Ambassador called at his request and said that he had come to inquire about the reported conversations between Japan and the United States. I said that I had hoped to be able within a week or two to send for the Ambassador and give him somewhat definite information as to the course of these conversations, meaning by this that I had hoped by that time they would have taken such a definite turn one way or the other that I could tell him something new in addition to what I said to him some months ago on this same subject. I added that I would be glad now, however, to make known to him anything I knew that would be of interest in the foregoing connection; that the same casual or exploratory conversations after an interruption of several weeks were now going on; that they have not reached any stage that would afford a basis for negotiations; that, as I promised the Chinese Ambassador at our meeting some time ago, this Government would not think of any negotiations that would affect the Chinese situation without first calling in the Ambassador and talking the entire matter over with him and his Government, as I would talk it over with the British, the Dutch and the Australians.
I then gave the Ambassador in very strict confidence the chief points which are set forth in the record of conversations and exchanges of memoranda between the Japanese Ambassador and myself and between the Ambassador and President Roosevelt. I made some reference to the military situation, as I had in my other conversations, [Page 422] stating that we were continuing to treat it as a world military movement. I then reviewed the military possibilities, pro and con, both in the West and in the East.
The Ambassador made it rather clear that China did not desire any peace at this time. His theory seemed to be that Japan was showing signs of weakening—which did not necessarily mean an early collapse—and that within a reasonable time she would be obliged to abandon any aggressive military activities and seek peace.
I brought out several possible developments that might occur in future, such as the possible collapse of Japan, referred to by the Ambassador; the possibility of Japan’s adopting all the basic principles of peaceful and normal international relations which this Government has been preaching and practicing, as well as applying those principles in a satisfactory manner; the possibility of Japan’s endeavoring to face both ways by entering into an agreement whereby under an implied reservation which Japan would contend for she would have a right to exercise force against another country or countries in a given set of circumstances; and the possibility that the governments opposed to Japan, including the United States, might refuse to enter into a peace settlement at the present time. I said that any of these developments might arise and that it was a question of the attitude towards each other of the governments concerned, if and when any of the foregoing possibilities should arise.
In conclusion I said that I would be only too glad to keep in close contact with the Ambassador in connection with this entire matter.