Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

740.0011 European War 1939/14631

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[Washington,] August 30, 1941.

The British Chargé d’Affaires called and said that his Government was in the act of sending a communication to Japan in the form of an ultimatum similar to the draft communications (copies attached) which he handed me, and he desired any comment that this Government might care to make. I gave him briefly the pros and cons of the present Japanese political situation, especially the domestic political situation and its present explosive nature, so his Government could form its own conclusions about presenting this ultimatum at this time. I said that it should in any event be presented confidentially and in a way that would not have a tendency to upset the present Japanese Cabinet. I recalled that we have recently hit the Japanese squarely in the face with respect to oil shipments to Vladivostok, to Churchill’s denunciation of Japan in his recent speech, to the sending of a military commission from this country to China⁶⁴ and to the President’s ultimatum to Japan a week ago Sunday. I added that these acts are being used by the fire-eating elements to pound the Government that is in power.

I stated that I would be glad to confer with my associates relative to the two alternative communications to Japan by Great Britain regarding any comment this Government might desire to make. The Chargé said that this would probably be presented orally to Japan with a copy in writing left in memorandum form with the Foreign Office.⁶⁵

C[ordell] H[ull]

[Annex 1]

British Draft Memorandum to the Japanese Government ⁶⁶

His Majesty’s Government are aware of the communication which President Roosevelt made to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17th⁶⁷ regarding the concern of the United States at Japanese military activities in Indo-China and the steps which the United States Government would be compelled to take if the Japanese Government pursued a similar policy in regard to neighbouring countries. His Majesty’s Government shares the concern of the United States Government and cannot disregard [the] plain threat to the security of British territories, which such a policy on the part of Japan would constitute.

His Majesty’s Government therefore, who have for their part no aggressive intentions either against countries bordering on British territories or against Japan herself, feel it necessary in the interest of peace to let the Japanese Government know that any further Japanese encroachment in the South-West Pacific area would compel His Majesty’s Government to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between Great Britain and Japan.

August 29, 1941.

[Annex 2]

Alternate British Draft Memorandum to the Japanese Government ⁶⁸

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have watched with grave concern successive encroachments of the Japanese armed forces in Indo-China and the accumulating evidence of an intention on the part of the Japanese Government to continue this policy of expansion by force or threat of force into countries bordering on British territories. They cannot disregard the plain threat to security of those territories which such a policy would constitute.

His Majesty’s Government therefore, who have for their part no aggressive intentions either against these countries or against Japan herself, feel that the time has come for most complete candour. They accordingly find it necessary, in the interests of peace, to let the Japanese Government know that any further Japanese encroachment in the South-West Pacific area would compel His Majesty’s Government to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between Great Britain and Japan.

August 29, 1941.

64. For correspondence concerning the military mission headed by Gen. John. Magruder, see vol. v, pp. 680–780 passim.
65. On October 15 the British Ambassador called on the Secretary of State in regard to Indochina and compared information. He “then referred to the ultimatum the British propose to send to Japan in regard to Indochina and Thailand.” The Secretary of State said to Lord Halifax that he “had nothing specially new in mind subsequent to my conversation with a member of the British Embassy on the same subject a short time ago, but that consideration would be given his inquiry.” (751G.94/390.)
66. Filed separately under 751G.94/393.
67. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 556.
68. Filed separately under 751G.94/394.