711.94/22443/11
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)25
Reference, Tokyo’s telegrams 1268, August 18, 10 p.m.,26 and 1271, August 19, 3 p.m. These telegrams contain Mr. Grew’s report on a conversation between him and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the M. F. A.’s request, on August 18 and comments thereon and recommendations by Mr. Grew himself.
At the outset, Mr. Grew stresses “the prime importance of secrecy”. He then states that previous to the meeting the Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office had told Mr. Dooman that “high hopes [Page 385] were being held in all influential quarters [sic]27 with regard to the outcome of today’s and possibly future conversations in the belief that they might eventually bring about a satisfactory adjustment of American-Japanese relations”; that Japan was ready to respond to any action [sic] by the United States intended to bring the conflict in the Far East to an end; but that Japan “would under no circumstances give in to any form of pressure”. [The Japanese had set the stage well.]
Next, Mr. Grew gives account of preliminary exchanges between the M. F. A. and himself. Then, he makes certain observations in anticipatory comment and reports the substance of the M. F. A.’s “oral statement.” The M. F. A.’s oral statement ran to the effect that the stationing of Japanese armed forces in Indochina had been “a peaceful and protective measure adopted for the purpose of bringing an end to the hostilities in China”; that notwithstanding Japan’s assurances, the American Government had adopted an economic measure against Japan which had brought our two countries very near to a complete rupture of economic relations and had left a big black spot on the long history of peaceful relations between our two countries; that the Japanese people were greatly aroused; that the Japanese Government had sent a reply to the President’s proposal of July 24 which reply “had been drafted with a view to meeting the intentions of the United States Government”; that the American Government had replied reiterating the substance of the President’s proposal and the Minister regretted that “too little importance was attached in the American reply to the intention and efforts of the Japanese Government to comply so far as possible with the proposal of the President”; that the China affair is the obstacle to peace in the Far East and that “since the United States desires [sic] peace in the Far East it is the hope of the Japanese Government that the United States will cooperate to bring about the termination of the China affair”; that “in the present crisis both Japan and the United States must do their duty as saviours of the world”; that “as a result of misunderstanding [sic] between our two countries and maneuvering by third powers …28 present relations between our two countries have become extremely strained and if we [sic] should fail to take steps to prevent them from becoming worse it would lead to a most critical situation”; that in the M. F. A.’s opinion “the only way to prevent this critical situation from arising is that there should be a direct meeting between the responsible people of both countries so that they might clarify their true intentions toward each other and study the possibility of curing [Page 386] the present situation by examining methods which will contribute toward the peace of the world and mankind”; that the M. F. A. felt that it would be highly desirable if the President would consent to meet Prince Konoye in Honolulu and to talk personally with him there; that there is “no precedent in Japanese history for the Prime Minister’s going abroad”; that Prince Konoye is fully aware of the objections that will be raised by certain elements in Japan; that it is the M. F. A.’s firm belief that “the President will be in harmony with him and will give his consent to the Japanese Government’s proposal”; that the M. F. A. firmly believes that such conversations “conducted from a broad-minded point of view … will lead to agreement on the general question of Japanese-American relations”; that it is most desirable that various measures of economic pressure against Japan be immediately stopped or greatly moderated and in this respect the Japanese Government is, of course, ready to reciprocate at once; and that secrecy is of great importance “as it is not difficult to imagine what would happen if the proposal should leak out prematurely.”
Mr. Grew then, in his 1271, states that “it is important to appraise … the full significance of the gesture”; first, “it shows a remarkable degree of courage”; second, “it reveals a supreme effort” on the part of the Japanese Government and implies that “the Japanese Government were prepared to make concessions of a far-reaching character” [?]; third, “it indicates a determination on the part of the Japanese Government to surmount extremist dictation” [?]. This “unprecedented step” should “be regarded less as the despairing play of a last card [toward avoiding an economic disaster, if threatened] than as an act of the highest statesmanship”; and “if viewed in that light it deserves to be met with magnanimity, and the Prime Minister deserves whatever support we can properly accord him” in this hazardous (to him) effort. In the light of a remark made by the M. F. A., Mr. Grew is led “to believe that the Japanese Government would expect that one of the primary conditions to be laid down by the American Government … would be with Japan’s withdrawal in fact … from the Axis.” The time element is important toward avoiding weakening of the moderate elements in Japan and reinforcing the extremists. “The most important aspect of the proposed meeting is that … it offers a definite opportunity …for at least arresting the present increasing momentum toward a head-on clash between Japan and the United States.” “Finally, we must accept almost as a mathematical certainty [?] the thought that if this outstanding and probably final [?] gesture on the part of the Japanese Government should fail … the alternative would be an eventual reconstruction or replacement of the present Cabinet [? How many times we have heard this during recent years.] with a view to placing the future destiny of the Japanese [Page 387] nation in the hands of the Army and Navy for an all-out do-or-die effort to extend Japan’s hegemony over all of ‘Greater East Asia’ entailing the inevitability of war with the United States [?]”.
At the very time when the Japanese Government was formulating this proposal, that Government was refusing to authorize departure from Japan of American nationals who were prepared to leave and whom we were prepared to take out on the S. S. President Coolidge.34 Yet, we are told, the American Government must not do anything which would provoke the Japanese lest our doing of such things interfere with the chance of there being consummated an agreement between the United States and Japan. Query: Which of the two countries most needs, wants and asks for an agreement, and to which of the two countries would the consummation of an agreement be of greater value?
Comment
Decision with regard to this matter should be made contingent upon there first having been arrived at between the two Governments a “meeting of the minds”. In the case of the meeting of the President and the British Prime Minister, a meeting of the minds had long before been arrived at as regards community of objectives. In discussions with the Japanese of the present proposal, conditions should be laid down along the lines of those sketched in Mr. Welles’ draft of August 16.35 It should, it is believed, be indicated to the Japanese that it will be possible for this Government to give favorable consideration to this proposal only if the Japanese authorities give evidence, by a suspension of offensive military operations, of a desire to have and to maintain peace with order and justice. It would, in my opinion, be not unreasonable for us to ask that this suspension of offensive military operations include suspension of unprovoked bombing of cities, et cetera, in China.
- Noted by the Secretary of State.↩
- Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 565; see also memorandum of August 18, ibid., p. 560.↩
- Brackets throughout this document appear in the original.↩
- Omissions throughout this document are indicated in the original.↩
- See also vol. v, pp. 397 ff.↩
- Apparently a revised draft of the document of August 15, p. 370. A revised draft dated August 16, but not initialed, is in FE Files, Lot 244.↩