751G.3743/7
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)
After talking with Mr. Welles on the telephone this noon from White Sulphur Springs, Secretary Hull talked with me in regard to the suggestion which he had made to Mr. Welles that consideration be given to having a further conference with the Japanese Ambassador in reference to rumors and reports that Japan intended to acquire military and naval bases in French Indochina. The Secretary suggested that in addition to the two approaches which we had already made to the Japanese Ambassador on this subject,41 a further approach might be useful for purpose of keeping the record clear, even if no other practical result should be accomplished. The Secretary suggested that in such approach to the Japanese Ambassador our whole attitude might be summed up, our interest in peace might be emphasized, reference might be made to the conversations which the Secretary had been carrying on with the Japanese Ambassador here and the underlying and controlling purpose of those conversations, the hope might be expressed that those conversations could be continued, it might be pointed out that the rumors and reports coming out during the past few weeks in regard to Japan’s plans pointed in a direction squarely opposite to the direction underlying the conversations which had been held with the Ambassador. The Secretary thought that from some aspects, such as the elimination of some elements from the Japanese Government, the present government might be in a sounder position than its predecessor to carry on the conversations.
The Secretary suggested that in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, such as he had raised for consideration, there might be pointed out to the Ambassador, as the Secretary had previously pointed out on many occasions, that there was a complete lack of excuse for Japan and the United States to have serious trouble. The Secretary suggested that if the Ambassador should say that the political situation in Japan would not permit the Japanese Government to make a drastic change in its policy at this time, we could indicate a disposition to be patient while the Japanese Government developed public opinion in Japan by their own means and in such ways as the Government thought best. The only thing which would be needed at this time as a first step to indicate that the Japanese Government sincerely desired to pursue courses of peace would be for the Japanese Government to desist from any reported plans to go ahead with the acquisition of [Page 335] military and naval bases in French Indochina. Any such move on Japan’s part would, the Secretary said, of course be regarded by the world as a step of aggression.
- See memoranda of July 5 and 15, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 499 and 506.↩