740.0011 P. W./260: Telegram
The Counselor of Embassy in China (Butrick) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 16—5:30 a.m.]
At a dinner last night an experienced observer with many good sources handed me a memorandum which I summarize as of interest. After 50 years of aggression and territorial expansion achieved through no clearly formulated policy except a basic urge abetted by opportunism and occasionally by expediency and unhandicapped by moral inhibitions, with Japan’s leaders and perhaps even the majority of its people differing only as to details of procedure or degree of aggression, the Japanese are now in a self-created quandary and despite much preparation and many lingering impulses for a southward drive and a desire for holdings in Eastern Siberia dating from the last European war (foiled then by American intervention) they hesitate. They fear that American pressure can therefore be effective as never before. American aid to China, the more spectacular the better, and increasingly stringent blockade measures against Japan are all that is needed.
Japanese statesmen and even high military officers have become steadily more aware of the necessity of settling the China war by (1) negotiating with Chiang, (2) the withdrawal of all armed forces from China and territorial waters and (3) some form of American participation. Last October Matsuoka with permission from an imperial conference and in a handwritten letter proposed tackling the withdrawal of Japanese troops in a year or even 6 months. This was the first official approach but there have been many informal attempts prior and since. Matsuoka was disconcerted when Chiang rejected his proposal.
For some months past an influential element among Japanese leaders has been ready to open peace negotiations even on the three points mentioned but they want prior assurance from Roosevelt and Chiang agreeing to such a conference. Opposition to this element has stiffened in Japan. Military and civilian exploitation of occupied China, especially North China, has been thoroughgoing and the withdrawal of troops would bring humiliation and financial loss to certain Japanese directly concerned.
Substantial Chinese opinion points to the ending of the war soon on terms acceptable to China and the United States if the latter gives prompt effective aid to China. One qualified Chinese contact allows the Japanese 2 or 3 years more on a purely economic basis; another closely associated with the Japanese thinks that a combination of [Page 323] moral and material factors will force the Japanese to seek peace by spring or early next summer. The former chairman of the North China puppet regime thinks the Japanese may not last the calendar year. The source of the above is Stuart.18 Above is strictly confidential.
It may well be that the United States could best protect its interests in the Far East not only vis-à-vis Japan but also China by participating in any negotiated settlement of the China-Japan hostilities.
Sent to Chungking, repeated to Department, code texts by mail to Shanghai and Tokyo.
- Dr. John Leighton Stuart, American president of Yenching University, at Peiping.↩