711.94/2126: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 27—9:54 a.m.]
743. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Department’s 297, May 24, 11 p.m.
1. There can be no doubt that any Japanese Government which assumed a bilateral commitment of the nature under reference, with the approval of the Emperor, the Cabinet and probably the Privy Council, would carry out the provisions of the settlement in good faith to the best of its ability.
2. The only elements in Japan which could effectively oppose the carrying out of such commitments would be the army or navy or elements in the army or navy, but it may be taken for granted that the Government would enter no such commitments without the approval of the War and Navy Ministers3 who in turn would not accord their approval without the support of the higher councils of the armed forces. We have good reason to believe that both the War and Navy Ministers in general terms favor a settlement along the general lines under discussion.
[Page 232]3. If the conclusion of such a settlement could be publicly confirmed by the Emperor in an Imperial Rescript, the provisions of the settlement would thereupon become the fixed policy of the country. It is our belief that the Japanese public would welcome such a settlement with a profound sense of relief.
4. Without analyzing seriatim the proposed terms of the settlement, it appears that the commitments on the American side would be largely abstentious or negative or would contemplate action of a character which would be regarded as normal in relation with a friendly country, while some of the commitments on the Japanese side would be of a nature requiring positive action. If the Japanese, after accepting the commitments, should fail in good faith to implement the agreement, the United States would thereupon be released from its own share of the commitments, and it is not perceived that during the process of implementation the position of the United States in the Far East could become considerably impaired.
It therefore appears that the United States has very much to gain from such a settlement and that even if satisfactory implementation on the part of Japan should fail, which we doubt, no serious loss to American interests would necessarily be incurred. The maintenance of the status quo ante, without important sacrifice in the meantime, would still be possible.
5. The points set forth in my present telegram should be considered in the light of our 741, May 26, 9 p.m. From the point of view of constructive statesmanship I believe that our Government should proceed with the negotiations with a view to entering the proposed commitments. The alternative might well be progressive deterioration of American-Japanese relations leading eventually to war. The possibility if not the probability of success would appear to justify the risk of failure. If a settlement on paper can be achieved, I have substantial hope that it will not fail in implementation.
- Gen. Hideki Tojo and Adm. Koshiro Oikawa, respectively.↩