711.94/2099: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 19—6:30 p.m.]
707. 1. Unlike my interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Office on May 14,73 our conversation this afternoon at his private residence, which lasted for nearly two hours, took place in an atmosphere of informality. After taking tea together we strolled in his private garden, both smoking pipes and chatting informally.
2. The Minister repeated that in our last conversation, even though it took place at the Foreign Office and was the first since his return from Europe, he had been speaking to me informally and not as to the American Ambassador and he had been much surprised to have received word from Admiral Nomura that you had said to him that the Minister had “intimidated” (Japanese word kyoi) me in our last interview. The Minister had therefore cabled back to Admiral Nomura to tell you when he happened to see you again that “he had neither intended ever to intimidate or ever actually had intimidated me but that he had merely stated in connection with my queries and arguments his own thoughts honestly and straightforwardly as is his usual custom.” He said to me, “I always think it best to lay aside as far as possible all formalities pertaining to our official positions and talk very frankly. Never have I imagined you would cable our talk to the State Department or else I would have been more careful and have taken a correct attitude.”
3. I said to the Minister that in my report of our conversation I had used the word “bellicose” as applying to the tone and substance of what he had said to me and I thereupon repeated the pertinent remarks which he had made to me which I had been led to characterize as having “grave and far-reaching implications.” The Minister did not question the accuracy of my report but said smilingly that while his words might have been bellicose his heart and thoughts were peaceful.
4. I said to the Minister that as American Ambassador to Japan one of my primary duties was to ascertain correctly the policy of the Japanese Government and to report that policy to my own Government just as Admiral Nomura must be doing similarly from Washington and that my only official channel for learning that policy was through him as Minister for Foreign Affairs. When, therefore, he discussed policy with me even as Mr. Grew and not as the American Ambassador [Page 205] it seemed to me obvious that I must report his views to my Government because he spoke for the Japanese Government. The Minister disagreed on the point and said that he was opposed to such reports because they often failed to give the correct impression and that while he was in Europe he had sent to the Cabinet only the briefest reports of his various conversations. He said that in discussing with me in our last conversation his views as to the applicability of article 3 of the Tripartite Pact he was dealing with a hypothetical situation and he was speaking merely his own personal views and not those of the Japanese Government. He nevertheless confirmed to me his views as expressed on May 14, namely, that if we should convoy our ships to England and if some of our ships should be sunk by the Germans and if war between Germany and the United States should ensue he thought that article 3 would come into force and that it would mean war between the United States and Japan. He said that he himself had strongly urged Hitler not to sink our ships.
5. I then said that the policy and actions of the United States toward the world movement of conquest were based upon the basic consideration of the inalienable rights of self-defense and that we would, of course, take such measure of self-defense as might become necessary in resisting a movement directed at world conquest by force which the utterances and the Nazi leaders had made it absolutely clear to be their policy and intentions. I spoke of the principles of international law in their application to freedom of the seas and to ineffective blockades and expressed the view that if Japan really desired peace with the United States our own measures of self-defense could not be interpreted as acts of aggression. The Minister replied that many principles of international law had been discarded both in the past war and in the present one and that if the United States should go to war with Germany there would have to be deliberation with Japan’s allies as to the applicability of article 3 in which Japan would have only one out of three votes. I expressed astonishment that Japan could thus be led to surrender her freedom of action in an issue of such vital importance to Japan’s own future. The Minister merely remarked that if we were to provoke Hitler the outcome might be exceedingly dangerous, I read to the Minister certain reported utterances of Hitler with regard to his aims at world domination with particular reference to the United States. The Minister expressed surprise and doubt at the authenticity of these reports because Hitler had assured him in Berlin that he bore no animosity and had no intentions against the United States.
6. I said to the Minister that as he had set forth to me his own views regarding the policy of Japan I desired to make perfectly clear [Page 206] to him the attitude of my own Government towards this whole issue and having asked for a further 10 minutes of his time I read to him the entire text of your address before the American Society of International Law on April 24 on the subject “The United States and the World Situation”.74 (I wish that Mr. Matsuoka could have heard your constructive address on the occasion of the inauguration of National Trade Week75 to which I have just listened on the radio but I shall see that the text is brought to his attention.) The Minister listened carefully to my reading, continually nodding his comprehension of every point and at the conclusion he said that he considered your address a very fine and clear presentation of the American point of view. He, however, wished to point out that there were other viewpoints and it seemed to him that we Americans were unable to put ourselves in the place of the other parties concerned. I replied that we must be guided by facts and actions which had rendered the position and attitudes of the other parties perfectly clear.
7. I told the Minister of the rumors which were floating around Tokyo with regard to our conversation of May 14, some of which had come to me from highly placed Japanese and which were so contrary to what had been said that I had been astonished at these stories. I repeated some of these reports to him and the Minister said that of course they were absurd. I mentioned one report, without revealing the source, that the Minister had just taken steps to appeal personally to the President to avoid the taking of provocative action against Germany. Mr. Matsuoka replied that the only message which he had sent to the President of such a nature was through Ambassador Steinhardt at Moscow.76
8. At the termination of our conversation the Minister said he hoped for frequent further talks and he thought that to gather informally around the tea table was the best method of conducting them.
9. The foregoing is a necessarily discursive report of the principal points which emerged in a 2-hour conversation.
- See telegram No. 673, May 14, 5 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 145.↩
- Department of State Bulletin, April 26, 1941, p. 491.↩
- Delivered May 18, Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1941, p. 573.↩
- See telegram No. 738, April 11, 5 p.m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 184.↩