711.94/5–1541
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
May 15, 1941.
In regard to the question of relying upon a treaty pledge given by Japan:
Is there any more reason for us to trust the militant militaristic element that is in control in Japan today (and which has been in control there since 1931) than to trust the militant militaristic element that is in control in Germany today (and which has been in control there since 1933)?
Would a treaty or agreement made with either of these controlling elements be any more to be relied upon than would a treaty or agreement made with the other?
What respect either of those powers might show for the pledges which they might give in a treaty is problematical. But that both are bent upon imperialistic expansion by any and all means of which they may have opportunity to avail themselves is generally understood and admitted; and that each proceeds on the principle that the end justifies the means is all too obvious.
If we choose to conclude a treaty with Japan, that is one thing. But if we think that by the concluding of a treaty and by placing reliance upon pledges given by Japan in such treaty we shall have safeguarded our position in the Pacific, shall have made ourselves secure there, and shall have been put in position safely to move our Navy (or the major portion of our battle fleet) into the Atlantic (thus abandoning our Far Eastern front)—that will be quite another thing.
Japan has “fooled” us and other countries with treaty pledges many times in the past. So much the worse for Japan. Thus far the “foolings” have not been fatal to us. But let us not “fool” ourselves. If we let ourselves be “fooled” both by Japan and by ourselves: if we [Page 191] rely for our security (or any part of it) on Japanese pledges—there may come fatality.
Japan is on the march—and she has been winning. Why should she stop—stop of her own accord? Japan wants relief from her embarrassments in China. Yes. But not because she has been defeated in China; not because it is clear that she cannot win in China. She wants to divert from the China campaign to possible other fields a considerable part of her armed forces and a substantial portion of her resources and reserves. A promise by Japan to withdraw her armed forces from China and steps by Japan in partial fulfillment of that pledge would cost Japan nothing. For, withdrawal of Japanese forces from China can only take place step by step and will take time. Each soldier that Japan takes out of the China campaign means one more soldier available to Japan for use elsewhere. The same is true regarding ships and every kind of matériel and every yen or dollar of exchange. And, the freer Japan becomes and the better prepared Japan becomes for adventuring elsewhere than in China, the greater the danger that Japan will adventure elsewhere (and even against the United States). Moreover, no matter how much Japan may withdraw from China, it will remain a fact that, so long as Japan’s military machine is intact and Japan’s militant militaristic element is in control in Japan and Japan is not involved elsewhere, Japan would be in position to go back at her convenience and almost at a moment’s notice into China.
Under existing circumstances, if and when we enter into a treaty with Japan we can be sure of but one thing and we can with warrant make but one assumption: namely, that by the fact of having entered into such treaty (no matter what its provisions) we will have contributed to a strengthening, temporarily at least, of the position in Japanese politics of those persons in Japan with whom in fact we will have concluded the said treaty.
In the realm of conjecture, it is my opinion that in so far as the conclusion of such a treaty might contribute toward withdrawal by Japan of increments of her armed forces from China, we, in entering into such a treaty, would have assisted Japan toward an improving of her position for pursuit of a policy of further adventuring southward or adventuring even against us; and that we would have contributed to an increasing of the danger that the United States may before the “European” war is brought to a conclusion have to fight in two oceans.