Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

711.94/213317/18

The Postmaster General (Walker) to the Secretary of State ⁴⁰

undated

Private explanation.

The Japanese Government has accepted our assurance that there will be no substantial modifications in the proposed “understanding.” They have acted accordingly.

The Understanding and its Explanation⁴¹ represent a revolution in Japanese politics and a triumph of the liberal over the militaristic forces in Japan. It was decided upon after a sharp struggle and in spite of threatened violence.

As proposed, it is a virtual treaty sanctioned by the Prime Minister, the Home and Foreign Ministers, the Chiefs of the War and Navy Departments, the Imperial Household and the Emperor himself.

The “understanding” is, in no sense, a memorandum from Mr. Matsuoka; in fact, he was the last to approve it, insisting that President Roosevelt, Mr. Hull and Mr. Walker could not support this “understanding” against the opposition of other Cabinet members and political leaders in the United States.

The Emperor had approved the “understanding” on May 8th; but after the speeches of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson, the Germans and pro-Axis Japanese insisted that convoys would be an Act of War requiring Japanese military participation on the side of the Axis. They further insisted that President Roosevelt would shortly announce convoys; and that the proposed “understanding” was therefore only an American trick to immobilize Japan. How this opposition was finally overcome we have not yet learned. I do know that cables and telephone messages (heard by myself) were conveyed assuring Konoye, General Muto, Count Arima, Matsuoka that the American Government was incapable of such treachery.

In the document submitted, it is remarkable that the statement of condition and principles (insisted upon by Mr. Hull) were considered as the most important elements and have not been changed by so much as a word. I heard Colonel Iwakuro telephone General Muto that no slightest modification should be made on these points—which imply the end of the totalitarian, militaristic movement in Japan. Consequently, the measure of Konoye’s domestic triumph is that these points have been approved without even a verbal change.

The other changes made in the “understanding” as submitted are not substantial and are explained in the “official explanation” which Admiral Nomura will present as part of the Understanding.

The explicit reference to the Axis Alliance was introduced to settle an argument but the other phrases referring to aggressive action and prejudging any action of the United States as defensive and protective leave the original not weakened but strengthened.

Under China Affair the complete change from specification to oriental generalization is a clever and face-saving compromise for domestic consumption. In fact, the “official explanation” specifies the terms without change from the original.

All references to a “new order” and a “co-prosperity sphere” have been deliberately ruled out by the Japanese Government; though they were asked for by Matsuoka.

I consider the form in which the “understanding” has been presented by the Japanese as an improvement on our original draft.

Colonel Iwakuro who has proved his great political power was most favorably impressed by the courtesy of his reception at San Francisco, by the firm and honest position of Mr. Walker and by the manifest sincerity of Mr. Hull. For the Japanese such things are more important than reasoned arguments.

As the Japanese have now submitted their official understanding, approved by their Emperor, they would be shocked and dismayed if at this time anyone in our Government were to say or do anything hostile to Japan. For us, this might not be misunderstood; but for the Japanese, it would cause consternation.

It would be most helpful to the position of Prince Konoye and his Cabinet, and to the easement of tension, if, on Wednesday night,⁴² President Roosevelt could make some reference to his well-founded hope for peace in the Pacific.

40. Received in the Department on May 12, with written notation at top: “This was prepared by my friend [Father Drought] contemplated to give background.”
41. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 420 and 423.
42. May 13.