740.0011 European War 1939/9230: Telegram
The Minister in Yugoslavia (Lane) to the Secretary of State
[Received, March 21, 1941—6:30 p.m.]
216. Personal for the Acting Secretary. My 212.58 Following based on conversations with Prince and Princess59 last night: Croats and Slovenes not only uninterested in Salonika but definitely opposed to Serbian interest there due to alleged competition with Adriatic ports. Maček and Kpsovec [Kuloveć?] therefore, while firmly opposed as is entire Government to “a single German soldier setting foot on Yugoslav soil”, not so concerned as Serbs regarding encirclement. They have apparently convinced Prince that people in Croatia and Slovenia will not support strong attitude re Salonika which might lead to war. This argument absurd as scope of negotiations kept very secret. (Three alternatives in my 21560 now only two:) (1) Attack Germany or Italy and (2) make compromise with Germany to “guarantee” country against invasion. Final decision not made up to last night but imminent: To sign Tripartite Pact without any military clauses.
My argument to both guests, aided by message in your 48,61 was as follows:
They admit democracies will eventually win, yet unlike President they will not look to future. I feared Prince influenced by advisers who look only to present and their own material interests. Signature Tripartite Pact would be step against their ally Greece, native country of Princess. Yugoslavs in United States would feel Prince had let them down. Why not refuse to sign. Pact would be no guarantee against later German [attack?] as past events proved but would merely tie Yugoslavia’s hands.
He agreed with last argument but said if he refused to accept guarantees war would come and Croatia and Slovenia would not fight while if guarantee accepted and Germany should attack, country would be united in resisting. He said that in opinion of General Staff only military possibility for Yugoslavia is to attack; defensive war would be fatal. But politically attack would be impossible.
[Page 963]I expressed opinion that Yugoslavia is in geographically strategic position because of common frontiers with both Germany and Italy. Neither wanted other here. Therefore, attack from abroad unlikely. Acceptance of Yugoslav proposals by Germany confirms this.
He disagreed saying that Hungary, Bulgaria, and Italy would partition country with Germany in event of German invasion.
I argued that he admits German invasion inevitable some day. In that case, why not preserve neutrality which signature of pact would destroy, keep Yugoslav diplomatic integrity intact and maintain reputation abroad.
He said, “You big nations are hard, you talk of our honor but you are far away.”
I replied that if we wished to pursue comfortable easy course, we would not have passed Aid-to-Democracies Bill and that our past and present attitude towards small nations, including Yugoslavia is proof of our sympathy.
My conclusions are that he wishes to avoid bloodshed at almost all costs and that he clings to Croatian-Slovenian arguments to support his position which he admits may provoke serious discontent throughout the country. He is a diplomat rather than a statesman, lacking the strength to make a decision of such vital importance. She is far stronger in attitude against Germany and urged me to emphasize on him President’s arguments. Her influence may still be effective but I fear situation has now developed beyond her control.