860H.00/1292
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
The Minister of Yugoslavia called to see me this afternoon in order to read to me a telegram he had just received from his Foreign Minister. This telegram which was some pages in length proved to be nothing more or less than a historical survey of Yugoslav foreign policy during the past year emphasizing the desire of Yugoslavia to prevent war from spreading to the Balkans; its unfortunate failure in [Page 960] achieving that objective; and its alleged need now to assure itself that it would not be attacked.
After the Minister had concluded, I remarked that this seemed to be an explanation which explained nothing.
The Minister said that his Foreign Minister’s telegram was an effort of which a schoolboy would be ashamed.
The Minister then said, however, that he had not yet lost hope that his Government would still refuse to sign any agreement with Germany. He said that the last newspaper reports seemed to make it clear that a new Cabinet Council meeting was now in progress and that the elimination of powerful Serb elements from the Cabinet had created such a political crisis that it seemed to him doubtful that the Government could go ahead and sign any agreement with Germany.
I asked the Minister what he thought the attitude of the Army would be, and he said that in his own judgment the Army, even though the Government apparently was now trying to purge the principal Serbian generals from the Army, would not agree to permit the Government to enter into any such agreement with Germany as that rumored.
The Minister said that he had been cabling the Regent directly and the Prime Minister directly all through last night and this morning. He said that he had used every argument in his power to convince them of the fatality of the step which they were apparently contemplating.
At this stage I communicated to the Minister the nature of the message which the Turkish Government had yesterday afternoon sent to the Government of Yugoslavia. The Minister had not previously been apprised of this.
I then said to the Minister that I was fully familiar with the President’s view regarding the situation in Yugoslavia and therefore, although the President was away, I felt warranted in stating officially to the Minister that if the Government of Yugoslavia entered into any agreement with Germany which either diminished the complete sovereignty or autonomy of Yugoslavia, or facilitated in any way by means of Yugoslav connivance or concessions a German attack upon Greece or upon the British forces in the Mediterranean region, or which in any way assisted the Axis powers in either a naval or a military sense, this Government would immediately freeze all Yugoslav funds held within the United States and would refuse to consider any request for assistance which Yugoslavia might subsequently make of this Government for help under the terms of the Lease-Lend bill. I further stated to the Minister that the effect of any agreement with Germany on the part of Yugoslavia on public opinion in the United States would be utterly and completely disastrous as the Minister well knew. To summarize, I said, while this Government might conceivably understand and palliate an agreement between Yugoslavia and [Page 961] Germany which was purely and solely a non-aggression agreement and nothing more, any agreement between Yugoslavia and Germany which in any sense permitted Germany military facilities would place Yugoslavia outside of the pale of the sympathies of the United States Government.
The Minister expressed his deep gratitude for the statement I had made to him and said that he hardly had to tell me that if Yugoslavia entered into any agreement of the character I had indicated, he would at once resign his position as Minister here. He said he had already conveyed this information both to Prince Paul and to the Prime Minister.