740.0011 European War 1939/11470: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 30—1:09 p.m.]
479. Personal for the Secretary and Under Secretary. I am venturing to address you personally in order to bring to your direct notice that in spite of the firm notes I have sent to the Foreign Minister and the further fact that some 5 weeks have elapsed since my first formal request, I am still awaiting an interview with the Caudillo. As I have learned through informal official sources that he is advised of my wish to see him, I can only interpret this silence as indicating increasing indifference to the views of our President and Government, quite apart from the Spanish Government’s habitual disregard of diplomatic usage. I now have a certain hesitation in pressing for this interview beyond the steps taken, in the continuing expectation that I may have amplifying instructions from the Department concerning subjects which I might initiate.
In all these circumstances therefore I would be grateful for your counsel as to whether I should become even more insistent that I be received or let the application drift.
In this general connection I would be remiss if I failed to emphasize what I consider to be the gravity of the existing situation and the sharp repercussions which world events are having here. The loss of Crete to the Germans is already unfavorably discounted, with a resulting growing belief that Suez will be the next to fall; and all this despite the President’s great speech22 and all its implications.
[Page 903]Quickly responding to events considered unfavorable to Great Britain, the Government-controlled press of Spain has returned with renewed violence to attacks on England and the United States. Further, Suñer’s position in Franco party and Government circles appears stronger than ever.
While disposed to maintain my former opinion that Franco is disinclined to sign the Tripartite Pact I cannot but feel that the entry of German armed forces into the Peninsula, an entry which would not and could not be effectively resisted, is ostensibly nearer. I need hardly point out that the ocupation of this peninsula by Axis forces would close the last Atlantic European ports and German domination would then extend from Narvik to Dakar.
I shall follow this telegram with a further message relating to certain personnel needs which are related to the implementing of our policies.
- Speech of May 27, 1941, Department of State Bulletin, May 81, 1941, p. 647.↩