740.0011 European War 1939/11357: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 27—3:23 p.m.]
456. With reference to point 6 of my No. 445, May 25, 6 p.m., in dealing with a totalitarian régime like that of Spain propaganda must be directed primarily at the Government itself rather than to the general public if it is to accomplish its immediate purpose. Cultural or mass propaganda undoubtedly would be of ultimate and cumulative benefit but the present problem is to make clear to the small and skeptical group comprising the Spanish Government the extent of our resources and economic power and to convince them that this cannot fail to bring about British victory. Politically the sympathy of the Spanish Government undoubtedly lies with Germany and recent military developments in Europe have strengthened the conviction of general military invincibility. Economically, on the other hand, Spain realizes that for the present its needs for goods from non-European sources makes it inadvisable definitely to ally itself with the Axis Powers. However, as German development of the economic resources of occupied territories becomes more effective it is almost certain that German diplomatic pressure will be implemented by assurances to Spain of increased economic aid in return for closer collaboration.
The object of our economic aid to Spain would be to emphasize to the Spanish Government the extent of Spain’s dependence upon Western Hemisphere and British Empire resources. To do this we must constantly keep before the Government the benefits to be derived from collaboration with the United States.
To drive home this conviction economic negotiations could be effectively employed. In such negotiations we could make use of the powerful instrument which we have now in export control. Through appropriate exercise of this control we could make Spain realize that concessions granted were real. The concessions which Spain would be required to make in return could be as flexible as circumstances might dictate. It is also probable that through such negotiations we might be able to have removed existing obstacles to such propaganda devices as motion picture films, periodicals and other printed matter. It is believed that concessions obtained from us by Spain through negotiations would have a greater propaganda effect on the Spanish Government itself than gifts or other voluntary gestures such as Red Cross supplies which latter, however, unquestionably do affect the attitude of the powerless mass.
[Page 902]Obviously if we are to obtain the desired propaganda effect such negotiations should be conducted in Madrid. Typical of the feeling among Spanish Government and party authorities which our propaganda must combat are the statements now being widely featured in the press of Salvador Merino, Chief of the Spanish Syndicalist organization following his recent return from Germany. “Entire Germany” says S. Merino “is a prodigious machine for making war which functions with extraordinary precision. Three million foreign workmen and six million prisoners at [of] war are working today in Germany. The German labor front has achieved solidarity of the human element in the enterprise and the entire German people feels itself united in a common destiny.”