Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, Europe, Volume II

740.0011 European War 1939/11796: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, June 8, 1941—noon.
[Received June 10—7:05 a.m.]

680. My 583, May 25, 4 p.m.⁴⁵ General de Gaulle⁴⁶ has submitted to me informally through an intermediary a memorandum of which a summary follows with the statement that it might be of interest to the Government of the United States. I have sent the General merely a simple acknowledgement.

1. So far as it is possible to formulate a concept of the present war it may be observed that it consists at least, in its military aspect, of operations whose points of departure are air bases which are progressively advanced toward the sources of power of the opposing side. The advance is effected by combined operations of mechanized air and land forces under conditions assuring communications with the world’s arsenals.

2. If the United States were obliged to place in action its military power the question would arise as to the air bases of which it could take advantage for the purpose of operating progressively against the territories of Europe and especially of Italy and Germany.

3. At first glance Great Britain would seem to serve as a base for operations against Europe. Actually, however, the British Isles do not offer favorable conditions for the deployment of American military forces. The particular character both moral and political of an eventual participation of the United States in the war, the enormous importance of such participation and the existence of certain differences between the American and English peoples in respect of their temperament, ideas and methods leads to the conclusion that although the aims of the two peoples are identic and their efforts convergent, nevertheless it would be desirable that their fields of action be not totally combined. Moreover, the area of the British Isles would not be sufficient for such a super-position and their geographic position bears limited strategic possibilities. Finally, communication between the United States and England is rendered precarious by the enemy.

4. It is in Africa that the United States should normally choose a zone in which it could establish bases for operations. Space in Africa is almost limitless and communication between American and African ports is easy and sure. Theoretically North Africa could have constituted the best zone for such a purpose. It is now too late. Since the Germans have established a foothold in Tripoli and control the Vichy authorities in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and since Vichy is daily collaborating more closely with Germany it would be purely delusive to contemplate a methodical establishment of American bases in this region. Even in the unlikely event [of?] certain Vichy authorities in North Africa entering the war on the side of the Allies this region would be so exposed to the aerial centers of the enemy that an American attempt to establish bases there undoubtedly would be nipped in the bud.

5. French West Africa with its principal port, Dakar, is under the control of Vichy and it is likely that the enemy could keep this area closed to the Americans. Egypt is now the center of a great battle and no longer offers the relative security necessary for military preparations on a vast scale and of long duration.

Consequently central French Africa may be envisaged as a base for the deployment of American forces. British Nigeria, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Eritrea, Delhi and the block of Free French territories including Chad, Cameroun, Gabon and Oubangui now constitute the normal zone for points of departure of vast inter-Allied operations in Africa, operations of which American power could form the principal constituent. The Belgian Congo, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika which from France epitomize good lines of communication with South Africa would complete this zone in depth.

6. In respect of the block of Free French territories the ports of Douala and Pointe Noire are available for the unloading of war materials and for assembling aircraft. Airfields in these territories now adequate for 150 planes could be easily and greatly enlarged. Railway and automobile communication link together in all seasons the principal cities (Brazzaville et al.) of this area.

7. Free France is willing to welcome on the territories which it administers in Africa for the accounts of France any installation which the United States may desire to establish there in anticipation of the latter’s military participation in the war. A commission which would be sent either secretly or openly by the United States Government with the view to study this question at first hand would receive every possible facility from the Free French authorities.

Kirk

45. Not printed.
46. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French.