851A.74/12–1541
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)
Mr. Moffat8a called me on long distance telephone at about 5:30 Washington time yesterday afternoon. He said that at the request of Vice Admiral Nelles, Chief of the Canadian Naval Staff, he had had an informal conversation with Admiral Muselier9 who it will be recalled is No. 2 to General de Gaulle9a in the Free French movement and who is now in Ottawa. Admiral Muselier told Mr. Moffat that he wished to discuss with him informally the following three subjects:
(1) St. Pierre and Miquelon.
Admiral Muselier told Mr. Moffat that he had orders from General de Gaulle which would enable him to land forces and take over the islands but that as far as he was concerned he was not going to act until he was sure that the proposed action was agreeable to the Governments of Newfoundland, Canada, and the United States. He intimated strongly but did not say explicitly that his action in the islands had the approval of the British Government. I asked Mr. Moffat what naval forces Admiral Muselier had. He replied that he has three corvettes on this side but that the movements of the vessels must be approved by the British Admiralty.
Mr. Moffat said that in the Department of External Affairs there was a division of thought regarding action in St. Pierre; one branch favoring direct action by Canada along the lines discussed with us and the other favoring action by the Free French. He continued that the Canadian Government had not yet received a reply to its urgent telegraphic inquiry of Mr. Churchill proposing action by Canada; this telegram was quoted to us in the Canadian Government’s memorandum of December 5. He said that from reading the memoranda of the conversations we had had with the Canadians here he implied that we favored action by the Canadian Government and inquired whether that was a correct assumption. I told him that it certainly was as regards my own views and that I believed Messrs. Atherton and Dunn10 also agreed that it would on the whole be preferable for Canada to act; I added that in my opinion this was not a good time for [Page 547] the Free French forces to act in this hemisphere. I continued, however, that I would confer with other officers in the Department and get in touch with him perhaps on Tuesday11 if we had any further views to express.
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