851A.74/12–841
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Samuel Reber of the Division of European Affairs
Mr. Wrong called at the Department of State this morning in order to discuss with Mr. Atherton,7 Mr. Hickerson,8 and Mr. Reber the proposals of the Canadian Government with respect to the control of wireless installations at St. Pierre which were included in the memorandum given by Mr. Wrong to Mr. Welles on December 5th.
Mr. Atherton mentioned the previous approach made to the Department of State on this subject, concerning which the Department had replied on November 8th that the information had been noted and that they had no comments to make. He then said that the question had been discussed at a meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on [Page 544] Defence on November 10th. At this meeting consideration had been given to a plan whereby the Canadian Government would request the Governor of St. Pierre to permit Canadian civilian inspectors to supervise the activities of radio stations in the Islands. The request would be presented as in the interests of the Islands, since rumours were circulating that the radio stations had been used to transmit information about ship movements, rumours which the Governor himself would doubtless wish to dispel by acquiescing in the Canadian proposal. It was recognized that the Governor would probably refuse. The Canadian spokesman would then inform the Governor that unless he agreed, Canada would not permit the release of any funds to purchase supplies for the Islands. Mr. Hickerson had agreed at Montreal to recommend, on the request of the Canadian Government, that the United States Government co-operate in this economic pressure.
Mr. Atherton continued that the United States Government is strongly of the opinion that this line of action should be tried before the more drastic procedure set forth in the Canadian memorandum of December 5th is even considered. He added that the United States officials feel that there is a good chance that economic pressure would produce the desired result, particularly since the Governor could undoubtedly be led to believe that his acquiescence under protest might avert more drastic action.
Mr. Wrong replied that he did not have full information on the reasons which had led the Canadian Government to omit the possible use of economic pressure from their proposals to deal with the situation. At present, there was no direct evidence that the wireless installations were being used to transmit information about shipping movements to Vichy for German use. He had heard that the Canadian Naval authorities were concerned lest, after the initial approach to the Administrator, which would probably be rejected, the transmission of shipping information might be either commenced or extended if there was an interval of some length between the first approach and the placing of Canadian personnel on the Island. He pointed out that the Islands were only about 75 miles from Argentia and that the United States Naval authorities had a very direct interest in seeing that the use of wireless at St. Pierre was rigidly supervised. The United States officials agreed that this was true and that the United States Navy is concerned over this unsupervised radio station.
After further discussion it was suggested by the representatives of the Department of State that the following course might be adopted by the Canadian Government. The approach to the Administrator could be made in three stages, the use of the second and third stages depending on the replies made by him. It would not be necessary to [Page 545] allow much time to elapse between each stage, and if it were essential the entire approach might be made during one day. First, the Administrator could be interviewed by some senior Canadian representative, who could tell him in a friendly manner that there were rumours that the wireless station was being employed in a manner inimical to our interests, especially through the transmission of cypher and code messages. It could be represented to him that while doubtless these reports were unfounded, he would wish to give no possible cause for apprehension. Therefore, he was being asked to grant facilities for civilian Canadian radio inspectors to take up their residence in the Island in order to supervise transmissions from the station.
In the likely event of the refusal of the Administrator to agree, it could immediately be pointed out to him that the Islands were dependent for their economic existence on funds released from Canadian and United States control, that the Canadian Government were prepared to prevent the further release of funds until wireless transmissions were effectively supervised, and that they had good reason to believe that the Government of the United States would take parallel action. The use of this threat would give the Administrator an opportunity to reverse his decision. He could excuse himself to his own Government by saying that he had to choose between Canadian supervision of the wireless installations and starvation for the islanders, and that he preferred the first to the second choice.
In the event, however, that the Administrator still was obdurate, a third stage could be employed to bring pressure upon him. He could be told not only that the release of further funds would be refused, but also that the Canadian authorities would record every message transmitted from the wireless station, and if any of these messages were in code or cypher or contained matter of assistance to the enemy, he would be responsible for any consequences which might follow. Any departure from these conditions could, if necessary, provide an occasion for the despatch of Canadian personnel to the Islands.
Mr. Atherton suggested that at the appropriate moment the French Minister to Canada should be informed of the situation and the steps being taken to meet it. He said that he felt it important to give the Vichy authorities no ground for contending that their representative had been slighted or ignored.
Later in the day Mr. Atherton informed Mr. Wrong by telephone that he had discussed this question with Secretary Hull, who approved a cautious course for the present along the lines suggested by the United States officials.