740.0011 European War 1939/15003: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:15 p.m.]
1170. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. I delivered the President’s letter dated August 21, to the Marshal this morning. Admiral [Page 430] Darlan was present, and after reading the Embassy’s French translation to himself, the Marshal stated that since it concerned questions of policy also in Admiral Darlan’s domain he should like to read it aloud, and did so.
The Marshal remarked to Admiral Darlan that since the letter was personal and confidential it should be kept so and not communicated to the Germans. He then went on to say that he has no intention of ceding any bases in Africa to the Germans, but that France is in the position of a conquered country and he never knows “when the diktat may come” which would affect North Africa. The Marshal continued that he has not changed his original position in regards to the use of French bases or the use of the French fleet to assist the Axis Powers, and that he will not agree to such use, although he has not sufficient power to prevent seizure of the bases if Germany should use its military power for that purpose.
Admiral Darlan said that it is necessary for France to assume a give-and-take attitude in the matter of providing food for German forces in Libya via Bizerte, but that he will not agree to use of African bases for military purposes.
The Marshal then turned to Darlan for his comments. Darlan stated that there are two ways for the Germans to get into Africa: One through Bizerte, which he thought would be quite difficult in view of the strong British naval forces in that area, and the Germans are not likely therefore to undertake it; and the second through Southern Spain to Spanish Morocco, which would be, “in view of German mastery of the air, impossible to prevent.” Gibraltar he said could easily be neutralized. His son, on a recent motor trip, saw 132 long range batteries of artillery on the road through Cadiz and Seville. On the other hand, he does not think that the Germans have any intention at the present time of any move against the Atlantic coast of Africa; it is not, he said, to their interest to make such a move; at any event, they have not gone into Spain yet, and for either route to Africa the French would have prior notice. The Germans are however suspicious he said of American activities in Africa and have consequently recently reinforced their Armistice Commission personnel in that area, thus continuing what he described as a “vicious circle of mutual mistrust of each other’s intentions by the United States and Germany in Africa.” He hoped, he said, that the President would understand the difficulties of his, Darlan’s position: That for 3 months he has “refused” to grant the Germans the right to ship foodstuffs across Tunis to Libya, but he does not know when “he may be forced to yield.” He has to “maneuver” and to give way on what he termed “minor points” in order to hold out on major questions, and he hoped this policy of give and take would be understood.
[Page 431]If he resists when pressure is renewed—he indicated there is none being exerted at the present moment—he may then be threatened with a military occupation of Bizerte against which “the French could not long hold out.” (He made no commitment, however, that any attempt to resist by force would in fact be made.) If he does reject this demand under such a threat, he said, it would bring about the very situation which the United States is anxious to avoid: German occupation of North Africa. The Marshal made no comment on Darlan’s reference to the possible passage of German foodstuffs through Tunis. Darlan added that land transport facilities are so deficient that he is sure the Germans could ship very little through that French colony.
Both the Marshal and Darlan then discussed a situation which is apparently very much present in their minds, namely, “the Gaullist and Communist” efforts to stir up trouble, particularly in the occupied zone, and to weaken the Marshal’s Government. Darlan said that the London Gaullist radio, which is “tolerated” by the British, by attacking the Marshal personally (he also referred to attacks on himself and, while ostensibly making light of them, it was quite clear that he resents them bitterly) and endeavoring to “incite revolution” against the Marshal’s Government is merely playing into the hands of the Germans. It might result, he said, if continued, in a complete occupation of the country and, once in Marseille and Toulon, the Germans “could proceed on into North Africa with nothing to stop them.” This he said would be disadvantageous to American and to British interests, as would be the replacement of the Marshal or himself, or a France torn by internal strife and turmoil. He is not asking that the British and American radios praise the Marshal and himself—in fact, such praise would prove a handicap—but merely that they refrain from personal attacks and inciting the population to revolt. He asked that this point be emphasized to the President “who must have, or should have, considerable influence with the British”. The Marshal broke in here to say: “Please tell the President that so long as the British tolerate De Gaulle and his activities, there can be no better understanding between them and ourselves,” and he reiterated, as he has so frequently in the past, that De Gaulle who was one time on his general staff is “a viper that he had warmed in his bosom”.
I then asked the Marshal if he had yet read the President’s address of last evening,75b and he said merely a few brief extracts. I handed him an English copy and will follow it with a French translation. I emphasized the importance and pertinence of the President’s address and summarized its purport.
[Page 432]As we were leaving the Marshal asked that I convey his appreciation of the letter and his high personal regards to the President. He indicated that a written reply will be made and that it will be transmitted through me. Darlan said privately that as he is leaving this evening for the south and will not be back in Vichy until Tuesday “there will be necessarily a few days delay in the reply.”
I should like to say that I consider the President’s letter extremely timely. It should serve to make our position abundantly clear and tend to encourage and facilitate resistance by the Marshal within the very definite limits of which he is capable.
This telegram has not been repeated to Murphy.
- Department of State Bulletin, September 13, 1941, p. 193.↩