740.0011 European War 1939/14942
The Counselor of Embassy in France (Murphy), Temporarily at Algiers, to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
Dear Mr. Under Secretary: I should like at this time to refer to your telegram No. 234 of August 6, 1941, in which you expressed the hope that it might shortly be possible to furnish concrete evidence of our Government’s desire to resist the forces of aggression, making reference to the developing situation in North Africa.
There is a mounting conviction here that if and when things flare up in Cyrenaica, General Weygand will be faced with some difficult decisions. If the Libyan campaign develops in the manner visualized by some military experts in this area, German pressure on Marshal Petain’s Government for the use of Tunisia and possibly other French North African territory may become exceedingly difficult for that Government to resist. The position of General Weygand would then become acute.
[Page 429]It goes without saying that if, at that critical moment, you would be able to convey to him definite assurances of support, his determination to resist would be immeasurably strengthened. To be effective such assurances should be substantial and should specify the quantities of matériel as well as the time lag in delivery which would be contemplated. In my conversations with him I find him eager for information as to American ability to play a role in this area, and unflagging in his determination to oppose German pressure.
Such assurances would provide General Weygand with every opportunity to profit by American assistance. By the same token he could not thereafter, even if he so desired, claim inability due to lack of means to resist aggression.
I presume that in such an eventuality at the critical moment you would instruct Ambassador Leahy to intervene with the Marshal’s Government suggesting that French concession of Mediterranean or Atlantic bases might lead to war with the United States.
If that is so and I could be authorized to repeat the message to General Weygand, it would be well at such time to convey to him something along the following lines:
“When you recommended to the French Government last year that it sue for an armistice, we believe that you were convinced that only in such manner, refraining from further concession, could France save its Empire. In that belief the United States decided to cooperate with you in a plan for the economic assistance of French North Africa.
“If the French Government is now unable to adhere to the objective for which it signed the Armistice Convention, it would mark a dangerous departure from the basis you recommended.
“As far as the United States is concerned, it is believed that our vital interests are threatened, and we are decided to act should France lend Mediterranean or Atlantic bases to the aggressor powers. We have at our disposal the means of decisive action. We believe that it is in France’s interest that they be used in friendly support of the French Empire. It rests with you to decide whether they will be used with or without you.”
Respectfully yours,