Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, Europe, Volume II

740.00112 European War 1939/2650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)

[Washington,] February 5, 1941.

Participants:	Mr. Nevile Butler, Minister-Counselor of the British Embassy.
	Mr. Ray Atherton, Acting Chief, Division of European Affairs.
	Mr. Samuel Reber, Division of European Affairs.

Mr. Butler called at his request to explain that last night a French emissary, Mr. Guerin,^70a had called at the British Embassy to say that the French Ambassador was very agitated as in his conversation with the Under Secretary of State yesterday⁷¹ he had received the definite impression that no further aid either to North Africa or metropolitan France could be expected. While Guerin did not so state he nevertheless gave the impression that he hoped the British would intervene to soften the American attitude. Mr. Atherton explained the American position as conveyed by Mr. Welles to Mr. Henry-Haye yesterday and went on to say that far from refusing aid to North Africa at the present time this Government was prepared to release funds to permit a shipment of petroleum products to North Africa in a French tanker on the understanding that the petroleum was destined solely for use in Morocco and would not be reexported. Mr. Atherton stated that the French had not yet been notified of this decision, but would be told that the British Embassy had been informed of the American interest in the release of this petroleum and its eventual arrival at its Moroccan destination.

Mr. Butler then stated that a British memorandum in regard to the entire question of supplies to North Africa would shortly be submitted to this Government. The principal points to be raised in this British memorandum may be summarized along the following lines:

The British Government welcomed the exercise of American influence in North Africa and was willing to support the gamble but did not, however, to any great extent share the confidence in the possibilities of Weygand’s eventual resistance. Nevertheless, the British Government was prepared to permit supply of certain goods essential to the maintenance of Moroccan economy by the United States on the understanding that they would not be reexported or in any way reach enemy hands. The stationing of American observers in North Africa to control these shipments would be desirable and it was proposed that the supplies could also be sent to Algiers and Tunisia, if the guarantee against their reexport could be made effective. West Africa, however, was to be excluded on account of British relations with General de Gaulle.^71a

There were, however, two considerations to which the British Government attached considerable importance. The first of these relates to its concern that the American procedure of negotiating with the Moroccan authorities without consulting Great Britain had endangered similar British negotiations which were also taking place. Mr. Atherton explained that American negotiations had in fact not yet begun and that Mr. Murphy had only been instructed to inform General Weygand that if the question of supplies to North Africa were to be favorably considered by this Government there would have to be a definite understanding that the goods were to be for North African use only and not for reexport to metropolitan France.

The British Government hoped that in any talks which might later take place the American Government would take cognizance of the importance to the British of the release of British and allied shipping now held in Moroccan ports. The British need for this shipping was vital and it was felt that if the North African authorities believed they could get all the supplies they wanted from the United States then they would feel no need to release these ships. The British recognized that the matter presented difficulties in the face of the opposition of the Wiesbaden Commission^71b but nevertheless attach great importance to some solution of the shipping question before agreeing to permit any supplies to reach North Africa.⁷²

R[ay] A[therton]

1. Paul Guérin, representative of the French Moroccan Railways, temporarily in the United States, attached to the French Embassy.
71. See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, February 4, p. 217.
72. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French.
73. German Armistice Commission set up to supervise carrying out of the terms of the German-French Armistice Treaty of June 22, 1940; for text of treaty, see Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, series D, vol. IX, p. 671.
72. Marginal note by Mr. Berle: “It might be pointed out, sometime, that the British had been quite ready to negotiate in North Africa (via Spain) without bothering to consult us.—A. A. B.”