740.00112 European War 1939/2261
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)
Mr. Helm brought Sir Gerald Campbell68 in to meet me today. I greeted him warmly, having known him for some years while he was stationed as Consul General in New York.
Mr. Helm then observed that he had, at length, an answer to our query of December 18th relating to the Morocco question. He handed me the attached memorandum.69
He said quite bluntly that they did not have the naval force to blockade Morocco. Neither did they dare to stop French ships going through Gibraltar. They were already aware that cargoes from France were going to Casablanca; were being trans-shipped to vessels sailing to Martinique; and were arriving thence at New York. He expected that presently they would omit the Casablanca stop; and finally go into straight New York–Marseilles trading. This would be a terrific hole in the British blockade.
He pointed out that the British Government apparently did propose to work out some kind of an arrangement with Morocco; and rather hoped that the United States Government would state what kinds and what amounts of commodities they would like to export to and import from Morocco.
I said that I was exceedingly glad to get the answer. I said that, as Mr. Helm knew from his recent conversation with Mr. Atherton, we had, in the absence of any knowledge of the British Government’s policy, gone ahead and talked with the Moroccan authorities, more specifically, had talked with representatives of General Weygand. Our impression was that we could permit a guarded amount of supplies [Page 251] to go into Morocco in order to keep the economic structure there intact. I said that naturally we should have to follow a flexible policy in this regard, and that how far we could pursue any such policy would turn on the political and military situation as it developed. I thought there were indications that a very considerable amount of American supervision might be possible.
Mr. Helm inquired whether the goods we permitted to go to Morocco were for African use or were designed for re-export to France. I said that our whole thinking had been in terms of goods needed in Africa; that while no details had been worked out, our present idea was to try to limit shipments to goods which were needed for Africa, and which would neither themselves pass to the European mainland, nor increase the amount of possible exports to France.
As to further exchanges with regard to the Moroccan policy, I said that I would have to consult with my associates before giving him any definite answer. My impression was that undoubtedly we should endeavor to cooperate in our common objective.
I added that I imagined at some time the problem of Syria would come up, since I gathered that we did not see altogether eye to eye with the British Government in connection with shipments to Syria. However, this could wait until a later occasion.70
- British Minister.↩
- Memorandum from the British Embassy, January 24, p. 242.↩
- For correspondence on this subject, see vol. iii, pp. 668 ff.↩