793.94119/711: Telegram
The First Secretary of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 13—10 a.m.]
513. Doctor Leighton Stuart confidentially informed the Embassy yesterday that on December 9 he met by appointment at the Japanese Embassy here Mr. Yamada, chief of the First Section of the East Asia Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office who had flown here from Tokyo. Mr. Yamada visited Peiping last summer when he discussed with Dr. Stuart the possibilities of Japanese-Chinese peace, and the present conversation, held at Mr. Yamada’s request, was a continuation of the previous talk. There follows a summary of Dr. Stuart’s memorandum of the conversation:
Mr. Yamada described how vigorously Mr. Matsuoka had labored to obtain approval to negotiate directly and officially with General Chiang Kai-shek, following which he had sent Mr. Tajiri, chief of the East Asia Bureau, to Hong Kong in the hope that this might be accomplished before it became necessary to recognize Wang Ching-wei’s government. He explained somewhat apologetically that the Japanese had promised Wang that they would not postpone such recognition beyond November 30.
[Page 467]In view of all this, General Chiang could not accept any assurances that the Japanese did not intend to interfere with Chinese sovereignty.
Mr. Yamada then inquired why General Chiang refused even to meet any of their representatives, and I answered that when I saw him last, in March 1940, General Chiang had given two reasons for this refusal; firstly, that he could not trust their delegates in view of their record, and, secondly, that he could not be assured that any of their delegates could really speak for the whole Japanese nation. To his question whether General Chiang could himself speak for China, I answered that he could, not because of any dictatorial authority he possessed but because he was considered by the Chinese nation as the incarnation of the popular will. I explained to Mr. Yamada that the Japanese recognition of Wang’s regime, or even the existence of such a regime, was not the real issue and had no real significance, for all such forms were only a creation of the Japanese military and under their control either directly or indirectly. I said that the only way in which China’s independence could be assured would be by the withdrawal from Chinese territory of all Japanese armed forces, and that, even if any Japanese delegate could succeed in meeting the General, this would be his inevitable reply. The Japanese problem was therefore among themselves in Tokyo, but that as soon as General Chiang could be assured that Japan was genuinely willing to withdraw all troops, peace discussions could easily be arranged.
Finally, I told him that after trying to interpret General Chiang’s attitude, I would venture some advice of my own, as one who wished for peace between Japan and China and who also believed that this was entirely feasible. I said that the Japanese could either continue the policy of force, and try to conquer and control all China for their own purposes, or they could attempt the policy of friendly relations, respecting the territorial and administrative integrity of China and gaining all legitimate benefits. The Japanese were, however, now trying to combine the two methods and obtain the advantages of both; this attempt was doomed to failure. I pointed out that if they followed the second policy, they would be able to restore good relations with the United States which was interested primarily in a stable peace in the Pacific; such a peace, I remarked, required a strong and independent China. Furthermore, if China and Japan joined in voluntary association, there would be no fear of any other foreign aggression.
I gave Mr. Yamada a set of questions which I had prepared for another Japanese who had come to Peiping on a similar mission, and after reading them he said that he would like to consult Mr. Matsuoka as to how they should be answered. I commented that these answers would help Japan, which was a prerequisite for any kind of negotiated peace.
A résumé of the ten questions will be transmitted by separate telegram.13
[Page 468]It is understood that Mr. Yamada is expected shortly to fly back to Tokyo.
Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Shanghai, Tokyo.
- Telegram No. 514, December 14, 2 p.m., not printed.↩