Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The Far East, Volume IV

711.94/1850: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State¹¹

Tokyo, December 8, 1940—noon.
[Received December 8—9:53 a.m.]

1296–1300. Embassy’s 1282, December 7, 9 a.m.

1. After the despatch of our telegram under reference, the member of the Japan Economic Federation, mentioned in paragraph numbered 1 thereof, called on me again on behalf of Mr. Y and further developed the situation, as follows:

2. Mr. Matsuoka had persuaded the Prime Minister and his colleagues in the Cabinet, including the Ministers of War and Navy,¹² of the wisdom of joining the Axis by categorical assurances that this step would cause the American Government and people to cease opposing Japan’s program and the creation of a “new order in East Asia”. The members of the Government now realize that they were misled by the Foreign Minister who had wrongly diagnosed the psychology and attitude of the American Government and people, but they and other influential people in Japan, including high military officers, are without accurate information concerning the American attitude and are unable to obtain such information from the Foreign Office because Mr. Matsuoka is unwilling to disseminate, even to his colleagues, information which might prove his former assurances erroneous and his policy unsound.

3. In view of this situation, informant states, it is regarded as of the highest importance that a Japanese not occupying official position but who commands the confidence of influential officials in Japan should visit the United States in order to sound out American opinion at first hand and to report accurately on his return to Japan. I have reason to believe that Mr. Y does enjoy that confidence. At any rate, informant states categorically that the Prime Minister, the War and Navy Ministers and General Muto, President of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, who is regarded as one of the most influential officers in the army, have all expressed their desire that Mr. Y should visit the United States. It is pointed out that such a visit and report by any Japanese having personal or business interests in the United States or who is regarded as pro-Anglo-Saxon would be valueless and futile. Mr. Y is known as having intense retaliatory [reactionary?] views and sentiments and it is therefore felt here that his eventual report on American opinion would be wholly objective and unbiased.

4. I had previously given informant photostats of several editorials from important American newspapers indicating the preponderant attitude of the American people towards Japan’s policy and actions. Informant states that he showed and translated these editorials to some of the officials and officers mentioned above and that they had expressed astonishment that they had been so completely misled with regard to the facts and views set forth therein. According to informant, this had strengthened the desire of those officials and officers that Mr. Y should proceed as soon as possible to the United States.

5. Mr. Y has written me a long letter in which he discusses the danger of war between the United States and Japan if the situation is allowed to drift as it is doing. He begs that the United States should try to understand the real Japan but he states (in translation) that “having read through the clippings of the American papers I frankly admit that the strong feelings of American citizens towards this country after the conclusion of the Triple Alliance are just and reasonable, and if I were an American I should have felt the same way. Therefore Ambassador Grew’s contention that until and unless Japan actually changes her attitude there can be no room for the adjustment of American-Japanese relations is, I believe, by no means unreasonable.” The writer acknowledges that it will be a long time before the Konoye Cabinet, which concluded the Tripartite Alliance, will be able to adjust relations with the United States through Admiral Nomura. “Under these circumstances,” he writes, “I am anxious to sound out the views and opinions of high American statesmen in order that I may be able to obtain such materials as will be useful to determine the direction which the Japanese Government should follow in the future.” It is obvious that the writer desires to see the President and the Secretary of State as well as prominent Senators, editors et cetera. Informant states, however, that Mr. Y, in view of my original advice, would confine himself chiefly to listening to and absorbing the American advice rather than to explaining the Japanese position.

6. I have carefully explained to informant why it would be difficult for Mr. Y to be received by high American officials without the support of the Japanese Embassy in Washington, and I decline to alter my original discouragement of his plans. I am inclined to feel, however, in view of Mr. Y’s strong influence and wide contacts in Japan and in spite of the opinions expressed in my 1282, December 7, 9 a.m., that some advantage might accrue if he were to proceed to the United States without American official encouragement and were to obtain even a limited grasp of American personal opinion through unofficial contacts in our country. It is apparent [In addition?], my British colleague, who knows Mr. Y well and is aware of his standing and influence in high official circles, has strongly urged upon me the advantage of such a visit.

7. If the Department believes that in the light of these new considerations Mr. Y’s proposed visit to the United States would at least be unobjectionable, I suggest that I be authorized to inform him that while the Embassy can give him no official encouragement, on the other hand no objections would be raised if he should decide to proceed with his plans. I am viewing this matter solely from the angle in Japan and shall be guided by the Department’s appraisal of the American angle. The matter seems to me sufficiently important to justify this long exposition.

8. Please instruct.

Grew

11. The five sections of this message, transmitted as telegrams Nos. 1296–1300, are printed as one document.
12. Gen. Hideki Tojo and Adm. Koshiro Oikawa.