893.00/14601: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

612. My 592, November 29, noon.

1.
A thoroughly reliable and well-informed Chinese of independent political persuasions informed an officer of the Embassy yesterday evening in confidence that although the Chinese Communists have resorted to various means to insure the retention of the new Fourth Army in central China, including personal appeals addressed to General Chiang Kai-shek through influential leaders such as Sun Fo, the Generalissimo has remained adamant in his demand that these Communist forces must remove to North China, that as a consequence of General Chiang’s intransigent attitude the Communists have now reluctantly consented to the gradual movement to North China of the new Fourth Army commencing at the end of January, 1941 and that the Generalissimo has sanctioned the delayed transfer, as reported immediately above, of the Communist forces in question.
2.
The informant had announced the view that the National Government and the Chinese Communists would be able to follow a policy of compromise and thus avert an open schism during the course of Sino-Japanese hostilities; and he said it is his opinion that an armed clash is not necessarily inevitable after the conclusion of the conflict with Japan though he admitted that it is a possibility. He thought that post-war Kuomintang-Communist relations might hinge largely on the attitude of Soviet Russia and the development in China of a form of democracy which would allow the Communists a measure of political self-expression.
3.
The local vernacular press yesterday prominently displayed a Tass report under a Moscow date line of December 5, reporting that the Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo had informed the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs that the “policy of the Soviet Union with regard to China remains without change.” It goes without saying [Page 461] that the Chinese are exceedingly pleased with this unique Russian pronouncement which I have reason to suspect was prompted by the Chinese Government. It may be well to relate also that the Foreign Minister and other Chinese officials have expressed delight mixed with astonishment that the Japanese would see fit to incorporate openly in their treaty with Wang Ching-wei provisions for the suppression of Communism (see article 3 of the treaty7). They feel, and perhaps rightly, that such tactics will go a long way toward preventing a Russo-Japanese rapprochement at the expense of the Chinese National Government.

Sent to Department only.

Johnson