711.94/1849: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State4
[Received December 7—8:55 a.m.]
1282–1284. 1. In a series of recent talks with the Assistant Commercial Attaché and myself, a well known-member of the Japan Economic Federation,5 speaking on behalf of the person6 mentioned in [Page 459] paragraph numbered 3 of our 227, April 2, 9 p.m., whom I shall refer to as “Mr. Y”, has developed at considerable length views and alleged facts which may be briefly summarized as follows:
2. All “sensible” Japanese are concerned over the recent turn in Japanese-American relations but they and other moderate leaders feel that no improvement can be expected under the present Cabinet and they are therefore working for a change. The business, financial and industrial leaders of Japan are unanimous in their opposition to the policies of the present Government. The cotton spinning interests of Osaka, for instance, were originally in favor of the military conquest of China and of economic penetration southward, but the loss of British and Netherlands colonial markets and the restrictions imposed by the Japanese authorities on shipments to the yen bloc has shown the spinners that the prosperity of the cotton industry considerably depends on favorable relations with the United States and Great Britain. This group includes even a number of high military leaders who are opposed to any movement which might lead to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia, realizing that if an understanding is reached between Japan and Soviet Russia there will be little hope for improved relations with the United States. If no improvement in Japanese-American relations follows the arrival of Admiral Nomura in Washington, the ultra-nationalists will not fail to capitalize his failure. Informant added that the “thinking” people in Japan are convinced that Mr. Matsuoka is rapidly losing his mind. From other sources I have been told that the Foreign Minister is on the verge of a nervous breakdown but in my personal contacts with him I have seen no indications to confirm such an allegation. The wish is probably more father to the thought.
3. The chief purpose of informant’s visits and remarks were to enlist my support of an early visit to the United States by Mr. Y in order to sound [out] American public opinion with a view to informing the moderate groups in Japan that an improvement in Japanese-American relations, even at this late date, is possible. He is said to have a plan or idea, not disclosed, which he believes would be immediately effective if adopted. I have a strong suspicion that this plan involves American intervention with the Chungking Government with a view to an early settlement of the hostilities in China which it is held would automatically bring about improved relations with the United States.
4. I have emphatically discouraged such a visit and have refused to discuss or even to touch upon the question of American intervention in China. I have, furthermore, clearly set forth the position of the American Government concerning Japanese policy and actions as well as the present status of American public opinion with regard [Page 460] thereto and the reasons therefor. Informant expressed great disappointment but appeared to be impressed, especially with my observation that the future trend of Japanese-American relations will depend upon facts, actions and realities and that any “sounding out” of American public opinion under present circumstances would be futile. Obviously the American Government and people earnestly desire good relations with Japan but not at the price which it now appears they would be expected to pay for such good relations.