Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat)

During the course of a conversation with the British Ambassador at lunch he said that he was as anxious as anybody else to get the British and French military forces off the Islands of Curaçao and Aruba. As he understood it, the chief danger still came from the fact that the interned Germans had not as yet all been removed from the Islands. Once this had been done, then any danger that might arise would come from the outside and could be met by naval patrolling. He said that he hoped the troops would be withdrawn as soon as the Governor was satisfied, and he said that he understood the Governor had already issued a proclamation that he did not need outside protection.

I told the Ambassador that this was correct, but that the proclamation had been issued before the landing of the British troops.

He said that he would keep after the matter, but that obviously he could not speak with authority on the purely military phases. He [Page 738] said that he knew the Secretary had his mind fixed on the Dutch East Indies, and that he fully shared his preoccupations in that direction.

Pierrepont Moffat