740.00119 European War 1939/585a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Matthews)
689. The French Ambassador called November 4 to hand me Marshal Pétain’s reply to the President. He brought up the subject of the relations between our two Governments and said that the Marshal was somewhat hurt at the tone of the President’s message and that we should appreciate the situation of the French Government at Vichy.
In general terms I reiterated the traditional friendship between France and the United States and our anxious desire to preserve in the most genuine manner that spirit of friendliness and mutual cooperation in every way that might be practicable and mutually desirable. I remarked that the chief trouble seemed to be that high-ranking officials in the French Government seem disposed to keep entirely away from this Government in almost everything that relates to normal relations and at the same time to keep extremely close to Hitler and to show every sympathetic interest in his plans and purposes, revealing all the while the utmost antipathy toward Great Britain and the cause for which she is fighting. I stated that this Government has the usual normal relations with all other governments except those at Tokyo, Berlin, Rome, and Vichy; that I can always understand readily the attitude of all the other governments and can get legitimate information promptly and voluntarily from all of them with the exception of the four mentioned; that Vichy along with Tokyo, Berlin, and Rome is just the opposite in its disposition to be frank and friendly. I said that I receive many rumors and reports about the attitude of the Vichy Government contrary to the interests of this country, but nothing direct, and I am obliged to look to other rumors and reports, direct and indirect, coming through the press and through foreign offices in various parts of the world, in order to get any real grasp of what is actually taking place at Vichy that is calculated seriously to affect this Government. I added that the French Government in adopting this attitude and practice will get nowhere in its relations with the Government of the United States. In answer to the Ambassador’s query I remarked that he knew that the definite impression created here and everywhere by Laval is that he is an extreme partisan of Hitler and [Page 483] Mussolini and very bitter toward Great Britain; that he is reported to favor strongly permanent rejection of the so-called “old order” in Europe, and embracing of Hitler’s political, social, and other policies with totalitarian autarchy a basic part. I added that we proposed to be on our guard with respect to acts of the Vichy Government inspired by Laval that are intended to aid by French connivance, military activities of Hitler, such as supplying of naval and air bases or other help given by the land, sea or air forces of France; that in any event this Government has had nothing resembling satisfactory information from the French Government about what is really going on that would constitute legitimate information to us from any government at all disposed to be friendly.
I then said that our Government thus far has retained its high regard for Marshal Pétain and his anxious desire to be of help to the French people to the fullest practical extent; that this Government recognizes the unfortunate situation of France as a captive nation and it recognizes to the fullest extent the duty of the French Government to conform to the armistice terms along with other functions and requirements of a captive nation, but that in so doing this Government maintains strongly its original position that the French Government has no justification of any sort to render the slightest military aid to Germany; that the French Government has no right in its acts and utterances to go beyond and outside the armistice terms for the purpose of making itself a partisan of Hitler, unless the French Government intends to abandon its friendly relations with other nations which are antagonistic to Hitler’s movements of conquest.
I said that Laval may think he can appease Hitler just as others heretofore have imagined that they could appease him; that that was his affair; that this Government, however, recognizing the great misfortune of the French Government in not pursuing the long-view objectives within sufficient time for its safety, does not propose to trust Hitler for one split second to fall in with any government on a course of appeasement; that the French Government therefore should understand the position of this Government and its determination to take no chances. I went on to say that this Government is not remotely thinking about minor considerations between our two Governments, such as freeing some French assets, etc., etc., but that it had a supreme and firm purpose to have no relations with any government, such as that of Vichy, which would give the slightest encouragement to Hitler, either directly or indirectly. I told the Ambassador that it was manifest that if Marshal Pétain feels aggrieved at the President’s recent message to him, he might well review and take cognizance of Laval’s extreme pro-German plans and efforts as reported in various ways to this Government and which have been concealed in the main by the [Page 484] French Government, and only reached this Government to a limited extent, directly or indirectly. I added that there must be a spirit of candor and a disposition to confer back and forth with full exchanges of information in a thoroughly accurate and candid manner, so that this Government will know exactly what the Government of France is doing in so far as it relates to possible aid to Hitler over and above the terms of the armistice and the function and duty of a captive of war. I said it would be a mistake for Marshal Pétain, knowing what is going on in his Government at the instance of Laval, to expect good relations between our countries to continue to exist, while he takes exception to any act or utterance of this Government in its strong protest against the reported policies and purposes of Laval.
The Ambassador endeavored to explain the reasons for Laval’s action and I said that again there comes up the matter of attempted appeasement of Hitler; that Hitler in the end would do what he pleases with all of his captive nations regardless of whether they offered him gifts and other appeasements; that he would take such nations and then at some future time retake them if his past acts are to be judged fairly; that this again brings back the question of rendering aid to Germany over and above the terms of the armistice, and that the Government of France must understand that this Government is too much concerned about possible future attacks by Hitler to acquiesce in the slightest with acts of the French Government that would aid or encourage Hitler in still wider conquest, especially in the direction of this hemisphere. I said that it is on this broad position that our Government rests its attitude toward France.
The above background material may also be of use to you in considering the problem mentioned in your 874, November 3, 11 a.m.39
- Not printed; it refers to a possible return of the French Government to Paris and move of the Diplomatic Corps to Amboise.↩